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A THEORY OF SELF-ENFORCING INDEFINITE AGREEMENTS
Robert E. Scott*
INTRODUCTION
All contracts are incomplete. There are, after all, infinite states of the world and the
capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance on each possible state are
finite.1 But incomplete contracts differ along several key dimensions. Many contracts are
incomplete because parties decline to condition performance on uncertain future states that they
cannot observe or verify to courts.2 In these cases, the incompleteness is exogenous to the
contract; that is, the parties are incapable of efficiently contracting over measures of performance
that cannot be verified.3 Other agreements, however, appear to be “deliberately” incomplete in
*

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor and Morgenthau & Matheson Distinguished Professor, University of
Virginia School of Law; Justin W. D’Atri Visiting Professor of Law, Business and Society, Columbia Law School. I
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Both transactions costs, broadly defined, and information asymmetries are formidable barriers to writing
complete contingent contracts.
2

The distinction between observable and verifiable information is analytically important in information
economics, but both concepts remain somewhat imprecise. According to standard economic theory, a datum of
information is “unobservable” if the other contracting party cannot perceive it. Buyers, for example, ordinarily
cannot observe a seller’s production cost. A datum of information is “observable but not verifiable” if the other
party can perceive it, but cannot prove the fact to a court or other third party at an acceptable cost. For example, an
employer usually can know which employees sometimes shirk, but it would be expensive relative to the gains to
prove to a court that a particular employee shirked 20% of the time. A datum of information thus is “verifiable” if a
party both can observe it and prove its existence to a third party. Legal scholars understand, of course, that what
can and cannot be proved to a court is often a function of factors other than the cost of producing evidence. See note
– infra.
3

Under modern law, these “open term” or relational contracts (where incompleteness is a function of
asymmetric information or other factors exogenous to the contract) are routinely enforced by courts. There is a rich
literature analyzing the optimal contractual response to uncertainty and environmental complexity in these on-going
relationships. A number of scholars have argued that parties write such contracts when uncertainty makes it costly to
negotiate fixed-performance terms, or because they better respond to problems of moral hazard. See e.g., Mark P.
Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997, 1007-09 (1992); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1981); Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in
Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 531-33; Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price
Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J. L. & Econ. 369, 370 (1987); Paul L.
Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J. l. Econ. & Org. 95,
101 (1988). All of these various explanations turn, at bottom, on the fact that the relevant measures of performance
are too costly to specify or are not verifiable. In this article, I put this category of contract aside and focus on

1

the sense that parties decline to condition performance on available, verifiable measures that
could be specified in the contract at relatively low cost. Thus, incompleteness is endogenous to
these agreements suggesting that the parties had other reasons for leaving the terms in question
unspecified.4
Traditional contract law doctrine appears to track this distinction. One of the core
principles of contact law is the requirement of definiteness. An agreement will not be enforced as
a contract if it is uncertain and indefinite in its material terms.5 A contract, that is, must be
sufficiently complete such that a court is able to determine the fact of breach and provide an
appropriate remedy. If so, the doctrine directs courts to enforce the agreement by filling
contractual gaps where necessary.6 Otherwise, the doctrine directs courts to deny enforcement
and leave the losses to lie where they fall.7 It is widely believed, however, that the indefiniteness
doctrine is largely ignored by contemporary courts. Conventional wisdom holds that courts
should (and do) strive whenever possible to fill contractual gaps with general standards of

agreements where the parties have declined to condition performance on verifiable measures that were available at
low cost.
4

Among the reasons for leaving verifiable terms unspecified are high transaction costs, inadvertence or, as I
suggest in this paper, an intent to use self-enforcing mechanisms such as reciprocity. For discussion see George G.
Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62
La. L. Rev. 1065, 1071-72 (2002). The argument here--that courts can (and do) make judgments about how
aggressively to fill contractual gaps based on the reasons why the agreement is incomplete-- is similar in some
respects to the argument advanced by Eggleston, Posner and Zeckhauser that courts should interpret simple
contracts either strictly or liberally based on the reasons for contractual simplicity. See Karen Eggleston, Eric Posner
and Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 N.W. U. L. Rev.
91 (2000).
5

See e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 111N.E. 822 (1916).

6

See e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204 (3).

7

This general proposition is qualified to the extent that the agreement has been partially executed by the
promisee. In that case, general principles of restitution may support a recovery on the basis of quantum meruit. See
Restatement (Second) §34(3), Comment d. Moreover, a few courts have granted relief on the basis of promissory
estoppel where the facts show a specific inducement by the promisor. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W. 2d 93,
97 (Tex. 1965).

2

reasonableness and good faith.8
But the conventional wisdom is misleading. A study of the contemporary case law on
indefinite contracts reveals some striking facts. First, there is a surprisingly high volume of
litigation. Second, despite the perceived influence of the Uniform Commercial Code and despite
widespread academic support for more judicial gap-filling, the indefiniteness doctrine lives on in
the common law of contract. In literally dozens of cases, American courts dismiss claims for
breach of contract on the grounds of indefiniteness, often without granting any relief to the
disappointed promisee.9
This evidence raises a fundamental question: Why do parties write deliberately
incomplete agreements in the shadow of a robust indefiniteness doctrine? One answer is that
these agreements may be self-enforcing. If the parties themselves can create efficient extra-legal
mechanisms for coping with problems of hidden action and hidden information, then they would
be indifferent to legal enforcement. Scholars have long understood that reputation and the
discipline of repeated interactions are efficient means of self-enforcement.10 But these conditions
for self-enforcement are stringent. Reputations work best in markets for homogeneous goods or

8

See e.g., 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95 AT 400 (1963):
The modern trend of the law is to favor the enforcement of contracts, to lean against their
enforceability because of uncertainty, and to carry out the intentions of the parties if this can feasibly be
done. ....[T]he court should not frustrate [the parties] intentions if it is possible to reach a fair and just result,
even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the parties
have left.
See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33, Comment a, and cases cited in note ----infra. In essence, the
disagreement between the common law and contemporary approaches concerns the presumption that should govern
in cases of incompleteness. Everyone agrees that the evidence must support a finding that the promisor intended to
be bound. The disagreement concerns just how pro-active a court should be in supplying terms the absence of which
would preclude giving a remedy. See TAN supra.
9

See cases collected in Table 2 infra. The frequency of dismissals on the grounds of indefiniteness is
inconsistent with conventional assumptions, but the failure to grant relief in the face of claims of reliance is even
more striking. See note —infra.
10

See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34
Econ. Inquiry 444 (1996); and Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
2005, 2039-2050 (1987).

3

in ethnically homogeneous communities,11 and parties in on-going relationships face end game
dilemmas. Indeed, most of the recently litigated cases do not appear to be self-enforcing in the
traditional sense. Rather, most are isolated transactions in heterogeneous markets between
strangers trading at arms length.12
Recent work in experimental economics suggests, however, that the domain of selfenforcing contracts may be considerably larger than has been conventionally understood. A
robust result of these experiments is that a significant fraction of individuals behave as if
reciprocity were an important motivation (even in isolated interactions with strangers) while a
comparable fraction react as if motivated entirely by self interest. The evidence that in any
population roughly half behave fairly and half behave selfishly provides the foundation for a
theory of fairness that is grounded in the human motivation to reciprocate.13 This theory predicts
that self-enforcement of deliberately incomplete contracts between strangers is more efficient
than the alternative of more complete, legally enforceable agreements.
A theory of reciprocal fairness also provides a fresh explanation for the prevalence of
informal agreements to agree despite judicial decisions denying enforcement to such agreements.
These “comfort agreements” can be understood as a means of screening potential trading
partners by which the parties gain valuable information about each other’s preferences for
reciprocity. In addition, the potency of reciprocal fairness as a method of self-enforcement
explains (and justifies) the resiliency of the common law indefiniteness doctrine in the face of a
contemporary academic consensus favoring the expansion of legal liability. The experimental
evidence suggests that transforming an informal, indefinite agreement into a legally binding
obligation is often counterproductive; legal liability can increase moral hazard and it may also

11

See Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative
to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349 (1981).
12

See TAN infra.

13

These experiments do not show that individuals have an intrinsic motivation to be fair. Rather they show
that individuals engage in voluntary cooperation in contexts where pure self-interest would dictate noncooperative
actions. The source of this behavior remains an open question. See TAN infra.
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“crowd out” the parties’ self-enforcing mechanisms.
In this Article, I argue that the observed preference for reciprocal fairness offers the best
available solution to the puzzle of deliberately incomplete agreements. Part I begins the analysis
by evaluating the large and hitherto neglected body of cases where courts decline to enforce
agreements on the grounds of indefiniteness. In many of these cases the parties appear to discard
verifiable information that they might have used to write more complete, legally enforceable
contracts. In Part II, I examine recent experimental evidence supporting a theory of reciprocal
fairness; a theory that greatly expands the domain of self-enforcing agreements. Part III then
turns to the central questions that underlie the legal regulation of indefinite agreements: Why do
parties write intentionally indefinite agreements? And, can the courts’ refusal to legally enforce
these agreements be justified? Fairness theory better explains the behavior of contracting parties
as well as the durability of the indefiniteness doctrine which, by narrowing the domain of legal
liability, preserves space for parties to exploit opportunities to reciprocate.
I conclude that the robust experimental evidence of self-enforcing reciprocity
undermines the conventional assumption that both fairness and efficiency are best served by
expanding the domain of contractual liability. The error in the conventional analysis has been
the instinct to generalize from litigated cases, where self-enforcement has broken down. But
these cases provide little guidance for how the law should treat the far greater number of
instances where reciprocity may well be the more efficient mechanism for making credible
promises.

I. RETHINKING THE LAW OF INDEFINITE CONTRACTS
A. The Goals of Legal Regulation
The first objective of contract law is to resolve a basic sorting problem. Our legal system
doe not enforce all promises, even those that were seriously intended. Thus, a normative theory
of contract law must explain why certain bargained-for promises deserve a presumption of
5

enforceability in the first place. One response is that the freedom to exchange entitlements
presupposes the freedom to contract for such an exchange. Both freedoms are supported by
norms of autonomy and efficiency. Parties who are denied either the freedom to contract or the
freedom to exchange entitlements suffer unnecessary constraints on their choices, constraints that
undermine the value of the entitlements themselves. Thus, the normative claim is that the law,
by standing behind a present promise to exchange entitlements in the future, offers individuals
more choices than they would otherwise enjoy and, other things being equal, more choice is
better than less.14
But this argument assumes too much. It assumes, for example, that promises are not
credible absent legal enforcement. Yet we know that contracts often are performed even in the
absence of any legal sanctions for breach. Contracts may be “self-enforcing” in two senses.15
First, where the parties contemplate making a series of contracts, neither party would breach an
early contract if the gains for the breacher were lower than the expected returns from future
contracts that would be thereby sacrificed. Second, neither party will breach if the gains from
breach are exceeded by the reputational costs of a broken promise. Both of these familiar
mechanisms for self-enforcement suffer from significant constraints, however. On-going
relationships inevitably come to an end and thus all repeated interactions are subject to a familiar
end-game problem. Indeed, in the limiting case, the anticipation of the last transaction may
cause the entire cooperative pattern to unravel.16 Reputation, in turn, will only work to make
promissory commitments credible if other contracting parties can conveniently learn about the
reasons why any particular transaction broke down. Reputations are difficult to establish in large
economies in which particular contracting parties are often anonymous to most market

14

Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1913 (1992).

15

There is an extensive literature on self-enforcing contracts. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler,
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615,617 (1981); L.G. Telser, A
Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. Econ.
& Org. 177, 201-02 (1985).
16

Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, supra note — at 2033.
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participants.17 Thus, it is generally assumed that many (if not most) contracts fall outside the selfenforcing range.
Legal rules matter, therefore, where reputation and repeat dealings do not or cannot
constrain the incentive to breach. In such an environment, legal enforcement is necessary to
ensure performance.18 The decision to enforce a contract legally raises a set of subsidiary
questions: What is the proper domain of freedom of contract? Within that domain, what is the
proper role of the state in interpreting the meaning of incomplete contracts?19 Much recent
scholarship has focused on one or the other of these subsidiary questions, but too little attention
has been directed to the initial sorting question and to understanding the line between informal,
self-enforcing agreements and legally enforceable contracts. These two domains are policed
principally by the doctrine of indefiniteness.
B. Indefinite Agreements at Common Law
One of the core principles of the common law of contract is that the promises of parties
to a legally enforceable contract must be certain and definite such that their intention may be

17

Reputations may work best in small trading communities, especially those with ethnically homogenous
members, where everything that happens soon becomes common knowledge, and boycotts of bad actors are
convenient to enforce. See Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349 (1981); Avner Grief, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons
from Medieval Trade in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 287 (Peter
Newman, ed. 1998). Reputational sanctions also can be effective in industries that can establish trade associations;
the associations become a form of collective memory regarding the contracting behavior of their members. See Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and
Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001); same author, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996).
18

Legal enforcement is necessary on social welfare grounds in at least two paradigmatic cases: in volatile
markets where a party’s failure to perform could threaten its partner’s survival; and where the contractual surplus
would be maximized if one or both of the parties made relation-specific investments. See Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. — (2003).
19

The freedom of contract question focuses on the set of mandatory rules that limit the enforcement of
certain contracts on either substantive policy grounds or because of defects in the bargaining process. Enforcement
of contracts within that domain then requires both a theory of interpretation that maps from the syntactic content of
the parties writing to the writings legal implications as well as a set of efficient default rules for those cases where
contracting costs may have prevented the parties from solving their contracting problems themselves. For
discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009, 1016-1022 (2002).

7

ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty. In the celebrated case of Varney v. Ditmars,
the New York Court of Appeals declined to enforce an agreement by an architect to give his
draftsman “a fair share of the profits” in exchange for a greater effort on some pressing
projects.20 The court held that such an agreement was not only uncertain, but “is necessarily
affected by so many other facts that are in themselves indefinite and uncertain that the intention
of the parties is pure conjecture....Such a executory contract must rest for performance upon the
honor and good faith of the parties making it.[emphasis added].”21
An earlier New York case, Macintosh v. Thompson, further illustrates the kind of
agreement that was found unenforceable under the common law rule.22 In Macintosh, the
plaintiff sued to recover compensation in addition to a stated salary which had already been paid.
He claimed that while he was employed by the defendants, he informed them that he intended to
quit unless he was given an increase in salary. In response, one of the defendants told him that
they would make it worth his while if he would stay on, promising to give him a share of the
profits on certain buildings that they were then constructing. When the plaintiff asked what
would be the amount of the bonus, he was told, “you can depend on me; I will see that you get a
satisfactory amount.” The court held that the arrangement was too indefinite to form the basis of
any obligation on the part of the defendant.23
This common law rule was not only applied to cases such as Varney and Macintosh, but
also extended to agreements where essential terms were explicitly left to further negotiation. For
example, in Petze v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., the New York court held that an agreement
providing that “the method of accounting to determine the net distributable profits is to be agreed

20

217 N.Y. 223, 111N.E. 822 (1916).

21

Id. At 225.

22

58 App. Div. 25, 68 N.Y.S. 492.

23

Id.
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upon later” was unenforceable under the indefiniteness rule.24 Courts thereafter consistently held
that such “agreements to agree” were unenforceable so long any essential term was open to
negotiation.25
Even at common law, the indefiniteness doctrine was subject to several qualifications.
First, indefiniteness would not prevent a recovery in quantum meruit in the event one party to an
informal agreement performed in reasonable reliance on its terms, even though they were vague,
indefinite and uncertain.26 Second, the question of whether the promise of a “fair” share of the
profits or a “reasonable” compensation was too indefinite depended on the subject matter of the
agreement. In sales of goods, for example, common law courts held that the words “fair and
reasonable value” were a synonym for “market value” and thus a definite promise to pay the fair
market value of goods was inferred from the express agreement of the parties.27 Indeed, the
common law courts went farther in the case of sales contracts, holding that even where a fixed
price or other consideration was not specified in the agreement, it was presumed that a
reasonable price was intended. Common law courts showed no reluctance, therefore, in filling
such gaps in sales contracts on the view that “such contracts are common, and when there is
nothing to limit or prevent an implication as to the price, they are binding obligations.”28
The rationale of the common law indefiniteness doctrine, then, was grounded in the
presumed intentions of the parties. But where the parties did not make their intentions clear, the
common law rule presumed that the failure to reach agreement on material terms, where no terms
could be objectively suppled, implied an intention not to be legally bound. Thus, under the
common law rule the question of intent was addressed indirectly, by looking at the extent to

24

25

125 App.Div. 267, 109 N.Y.S. 328, 331.
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 34-44, 322-325 (3D ED. 2002).

26

See e.g., Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77A.2d 598 (Me. 1951).

27

Varney v. Ditmars, supra note — at 225.

28

Id.
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which material terms were left unspecified by the parties. If the court found that the terms were
sufficiently complete and definite, it would infer from that fact the intent to contract; if not, the
court would infer that the parties did not intend to be bound.
C. The Modern View on Indefiniteness and Open Terms
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code followed the line of cases that held that
price terms in sales contracts could be supplied from evidence of market prices. Thus, UCC §2305 provides that the parties can conclude a sales contract even though the price is not specified
or they agree to agree on a price and are subsequently unable to agree.29 But the Code goes
beyond the common law in explicitly authorizing an expansive role for courts in filling open
terms in otherwise incomplete agreements.30 As I noted above, the justification for the common
law rule was that it honored the intent of the parties. That is also the justification for UCC § 2204: it honors the parties’ intent to be bound. The difference, then, is not the purpose of the rule
but the presumption that follows from agreements with open or indefinite terms. The UCC shifts
from the bright-line rule of the common law to a broad standard. Under the UCC standard, a
court is asked to focus on the underlying question of intent directly, and is encouraged to infer
that intent despite the existence of open or indefinite terms. That, of course, is just what many
courts have done.31
The standard-based approach of the UCC, now followed as well by the Restatement,32 is
justified primarily by the defects of the common law bright-line rule: in many contracting
contexts a rule that determines intent by focusing on missing terms is seriously over-inclusive.
29

UCC § 2-305 (2002).

30

UCC § 2-204 (2002) provides that “even though one or more terms is left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy.” The Official Comment provides that “the fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed
upon [is not] of itself enough to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement. Rather commercial standards...are intended
to be applied, this act making provision elsewhere for missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies
and the like.” Id.
31

SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note — at 315-322.

32

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §33.
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All contracts are incomplete and thus the fact of incompleteness per se does not necessarily
imply an intention to avoid legal enforcement. Incompleteness may be caused by many factors
including the desire for flexibility and the unwillingness of parties to condition future
performance on non-observable or non-verifiable measures of performance. Thus, an intention
to be bound to terms reasonably supplied by courts may often be the best inference to be drawn
from relational contracts that are incomplete owing to such exogenous factors.33
But, at least implicitly, the modern approach goes even farther and shifts the presumption
toward enforcement whenever terms are left open or are indefinite. Professor Corbin perhaps
best expressed this view:
The modern trend of the law is to favor the enforcement of contracts, to lean against their
unenforceability because of uncertainty, and to carry out the intentions of the parties if
this can feasibly be done.... The usual and reasonable terms found in similar contracts can
be looked to, unexpressed provisions of the contract may be inferred from the writing,
external facts may be relied upon and custom and usage may be resorted to in an effort to
supply a deficiency....

34

The contemporary presumption toward filling gaps in incomplete contracts has led many
to assume that the common law indefiniteness doctrine is no longer a serious impediment to legal

33

See note 3 supra. To be sure, intention to be legally bound is not the only inference to be drawn from
exogenous incompleteness. Another possibility is that the parties intend to renegotiate ex post once the uncertainty
is removed.
34

1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95 AT 400 (1963). See also, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 33, Comment a. (“The actions of the parties may show conclusively that they have intended to conclude
a bargain, even though one or more terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon. In such cases courts endeavor, if
possible, to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the contract.”). Justice Cardozo put the contemporary
presumption in favor of enforcement this way: “Indefiniteness must reach the point where construction becomes
impossible.” Heyman Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (N.Y. 1921). See also Novelly Oil
Co. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 433 N.W. 2d 628, 629 (Wis. 1988) (describing the “liberality” of the indefiniteness
principle); Denver D. Darling, Inc., v. Controlled Environments Construction, Inc., 89 Cal.App. 4th 1221, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 213 (2001) (same); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 468 A.2d 748,766 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983)(same).
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enforcement.35 But, surprisingly, the nearly universal acceptance of the judicial practice of
supplying open terms for relational contracts has not slowed the pace of litigation over indefinite
agreements. Moreover, even when these agreements are assessed under the contemporary
standard, many fail to pass muster. Even the most casual review of judicial decisions over the
past twenty years finds courts invoking the indefiniteness doctrine to refuse enforcement of
promises to “provide future financing,”36 to send a seller “some work,”37 to pay “costs and
expenses for a sumptuous living and maintenance,”38 to forgo collection “so long as [debtor]
makes progress toward profitability,”39 to “employ seller to go on the road,”40 to provide “loan
supervision information,”41 to sell property at a “price to be determined in accordance with
applicable rules and regulations,”42 and to sell property at “the appraised bid as established by
three disinterested persons.”43
In sum, the law of indefiniteness is not a story of a traditional common law rule for
limiting legal liability being inexorably overturned by a contemporary preference for filling gaps
with broad standards of good faith, reasonableness and the like. Evidence that courts continue to
sort agreements that lack material terms on the basis of the indefiniteness doctrine raises several
key questions: Is this simply a further example of the tension between common law formalism

35

See e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997, 1062 (1992)
(providing arguments against “the now (happily) discredited doctrine that courts ought not to enforce indefinite
contracts....”).
36

Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W. 2d 712 (N.D. 1989).

37

Roy v. Danis, 553 A.2d 663 (Me 1989).

38

Trimmer v. Van Bomel, 107 Misc. 2d 201, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (1980).

39

Champaign National Bank v. Landers Seed Co., Inc., 165 Ill. App.3d 1090, 116 Ill. Dec. 742, 519 N.E.2d
957 (1988).
40

Roy v. Danis, 553 A.2d 663 (Me 1989).

41

University National Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.App. 1989).

42

Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry and Warren, 74 N.Y. 2d 475, 548 N.E. 2d 203 (1989).

43

Kane v. McDermott, 191 Ill.App.3d 212, 547 N.E.2d 708 (1989).
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and Code contextualism; a tension that is clearly evident, for example in widely disparate
theories of contractual interpretation?44 If not, what are the factors that determine when a
contract is likely to be held unenforceable owing to indefiniteness, and how do these agreements
differ from those where courts routinely fill gaps with open terms? These questions cannot be
answered so long as the patterns of contemporary indefiniteness litigation are examined casually
and unsystematically. In the following discussion, therefore, I report the results of a systematic
examination of the indefiniteness case law and undertake a functional analysis of how courts do,
in fact, sort between enforceable and unenforceable agreements.
D. What Do Courts Actually Do?
In order to create a data base for evaluating the enforcement decisions of contemporary
American courts, I began with a sample of all litigated cases between 1998 and 2002. A LEXIS
search for cases of the past four years that invoke indefiniteness in close conjunction with
unenforceable contracts, returned 238 hits. That number was confirmed by a parallel WestLaw
key number search under the contract law doctrine of definiteness or certainty. A detailed
examination of 137 cases randomly selected from this base pool revealed forty-eight cases where
the issue of indefiniteness was only peripherally relevant to the outcome. In many of these cases,
the issue was raised in the context of preliminary negotiations where the defendant claimed that
the representation relied on by the plaintiff was insufficiently definite to be characterized as an
offer or an acceptance. In these instances, therefore, the underlying question was whether the
parties had reached an agreement at all, rather than the further question: Assuming the parties
have concluded an agreement, is that agreement legally enforceable as a contract?45
See, for example, the current split between courts that apply a “hard” parol evidence rule and a strong
plain meaning rule and courts following the “soft” parol evidence and contextual meaning of the UCC. Eric Posner,
The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 533 (1998).
44

45

The issue of precontractual liability raises interesting but quite different questions from those discussed in
this paper. For those reasons, I leave aside the issues of precontractual reliance and the related question of when, if
ever, liability should attach prior to the conclusion of an agreement (albeit an indefinite one). For the best doctrinal
analysis of this question, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1987). For recent law and economic analyses, see Avery
Katz, When Should the Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale
L. J. 1249 (1993); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1996); Jason
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The remaining eighty-nine cases directly raise the issue of enforcement.46 In thirty-four
cases the court enforced the contract despite the defendant’s claim that the agreement was
indefinite. In the remaining fifty-five cases the court denied enforcement, despite the finding that
the parties had concluded an agreement, on the grounds that the agreement was too indefinite and
uncertain and thus was legally unenforceable as a contract.47 One hypothesis that might explain
the different results is that those courts enforcing allegedly indefinite agreements are following
the trend of the UCC and the Second Restatement, while the larger number of courts that deny
enforcement are adhering to the traditional common law view.48 This hypothesis implies 1) that
the cases granting enforcement would include a larger number of Code cases, and 2) that nonCode cases would divide between states following the traditional view and those adopting the
modern approach to open terms.
Neither of these empirical conditions is confirmed by the data. First, only one of the
cases granting enforcement involved the sale of goods under the UCC. Indeed, in only three
instances did a court cite with approval the Code approach to open terms,49 and the Second

Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85
Va..L. Rev. 385 (1999).
46

The cases are coded and tabulated in Tables 1 & 2 infra at ----.

47

It is equally noteworthy that, of the fifty-five cases denying enforcement on the grounds of uncertainty,
only two authorized restitutionary relief for the plaintiff. See Bergman v. DeIulio, 826 So. 2d 500 (Fla. App. 2002)
(plaintiff had viable quantum meruit claim against defendant but could not recover damages on his claim); Allied
Erecting & Dismantling co., Inc. v. UNECO Realty co., 765 N.E. 2d 420 (2001) (same). The conventional view is
that a promisee can recover in restitution for partial performance of an indefinite agreement. Thus, for, example,
courts have permitted an employee to recover in quantum meruit for the value of extra efforts induced by his
employer’s promise to share the resulting profits. See, e.g, Bragdon v. Shapiro, 77A.2d 598 (Me. 1951); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §3.30 (3D ED. 1999). But where both the promise to perform additional work as well as
the promise to provide a “bonus” are indefinite, the cases from the sample deny relief altogether. See Table 2 infra.
48

See Note, Contract with Open or Missing Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common
Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 52-53 (2003) (framing the divergent results in the cases as
a jurisdictional divide in which “some jurisdictions apply the traditional common law doctrine to hold such contracts
invalid...while others apply the UCC analysis to hold such contracts enforceable.”)
49

See e.g., American Laminates, Inc. v. J.S. Latta Co., 980 S.W. 2d 12 (Mo. App. 1998); Willow Funding
Co., L.P. v. Grencom Associates, 779 A.2d 174 (Conn. App. 2001)(citing UCC § 2-204(3)). One possible
explanation for the absence of Code cases in the sample is that the Code rule on open terms, especially price terms, is
sufficiently clear and well-established that parties decline to litigate “settled” law.
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Restatement view was the basis for decision in just four others.50 Moreover, the division
between enforcement and non-enforcement is not correlated with whether or not the state has a
traditional or modern view on contractual liability. In two states, California and Pennsylvania,
the courts acknowledged a presumption favoring enforcement and filling gaps whenever
possible. But notwithstanding the presumption, courts in those states divided on the question of
whether the agreement at issue was enforceable. In the remaining thirty-two states, the courts at
least formally applied the traditional indefiniteness doctrine, yet the cases divided roughly two to
one between non-enforcement and enforcement. In eight of those states–Connecticut, Maryland,
New York, Illinois, Ohio, Georgia, Tennessee and Texas-- appellate courts reached different
enforcement decisions on different facts.51 Taken as a whole, therefore, the data tend to refute the
conventional academic wisdom that the legal standard by itself influences the enforcement
choice.52
Rather, the cases drawn from the sample show that courts, in general, focus on whether
the parties have fully exploited verifiable information in concluding their agreements.53 Where
the

50

See, e.g., Davidson v. Holtzman, 47 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. App. 2001).

51

New York is perhaps the most influential state in the sample. Sixteen indefiniteness cases came out of
New York courts. Enforcement was denied in thirteen instances and granted in three.
52

Cf Note, supra note 48 at 52-53.

53

In coding the nature of the information available to the parties to these agreements, I use a richer
conception of verifiability than is common to formal contract theory. I define a measure of performance as verifiable
if competent legal counsel is prepared to opine, ex ante, that the failure of the other party to perform can be
demonstrated to a court with a positive probability of success. Relevant to this prediction is not only the cost of
producing evidence but also the relationship between the legal standard of proof and the management of evidence
and the relative complexity and interdependence of the measures of performance in the contract. This definition of
verifiability raises a further complication that I sidestep in this paper. This paper, and most economic theory, treat
verifiability as an exogenous variable. But, in fact, whether a measure of performance is verifiable or not is subject
to some party control. Thus, the motivation for a particular contract term may be the ability of the moving party to
manipulate the proof necessary to establish the fact in question. See e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale,
Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts, 2 Economic Theory 1 (1992). For a
discussion of the relationship between optimal contract design and the strategic management of evidence, see Chris
Sanchirico & George G. Triantis, Evidence Fabrication, Verifiability and Contract Design (mimeo 2002).
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contract is incomplete owing to uncertain future states that are not observable or not verifiable,
the courts will typically enforce the contract by filling the resulting gaps. In that sense, the
disputed performance is not “contractible” and the incompleteness is thus exogenous to the
contract. But if the parties appear to have discarded verifiable information that they might have
used at relatively low cost to condition performance, the courts decline to enforce the agreement
legally. Here the failure to use available measures of performance suggests either that the parties
action was the result of inadvertence or that the agreement was deliberately indefinite.
1. Legally Enforceable Incompleteness
In thirty-four cases in the sample the courts enforced contracts notwithstanding the claim
of indefiniteness.54 The legally enforceable agreements ranged across a variety of contexts from
business development and marketing55 to investment contracts,56 and from distributorship
agreements57 to joint ventures.58

In each of these contexts, the parties faced the canonical

“contracting problem” of ensuring both efficient ex ante investment and efficient ex post trade in
the subject matter of the contract.59 In each case, however, the parties negotiated over complex
transactions and were forced to cope with problems of hidden action and hidden information.
Thus, high transactions costs as well as problems of asymmetric information 60 would likely
54

See Table 1 infra.

55

Quadron Software International Corporation v. Plotseneder, 256 Ga.App. 284, 568 S.E.2d 178 (2002).

56

Giannaris v. C.Y. Cheng, 219 F. Supp.2d 687 (D. Md. 2002).

57

Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (2001).

58

DeBoer Structures (U.S.A.) Inc, v. Shaffer Tent and Awning Co., 233 F. Supp.2d 934 (2002).

59

Parties invest efficiently when they take actions that maximize their deal’s expected surplus. Parties trade
efficiently when, and only when, the value of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of
performance to the seller. Most would agree that contract law should attempt to facilitate efficient investment and
trade.
60

Information is asymmetric when it is either unobservable or unverifiable. For a concise but moderately
technical explanation of this phenomenon, see Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts in 2 The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law 277-83 (1998);. See also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992). For formal analyses of the effects of
asymmetric information on incomplete contracting, see Hermalin & Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts
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have prevented the parties to these contracts from writing complete, first-best efficient contracts.
When these conditions prevent parties from creating a term, the resulting contract is incomplete
but may nevertheless be second-best efficient.
To understand the reasoning that underlies this conclusion, consider a salient example,
Krantz v. BT Visual Images.61 In Krantz, the plaintiff and the defendants were in the business of
marketing telecommunications systems. Plaintiff alleged that he and the defendants had entered
into a “reseller agreement” by which defendant appointed plaintiff its distributor for San
Francisco and Marin County with the right to sell its video conferencing equipment and other
products. Thereafter, plaintiff and defendant signed a “teaming agreement” in which they agreed
to submit a joint bid for Kaiser Permanente’s video conferencing business both within and
outside the Bay area. To enhance the chances of getting the contract with Kaiser, plaintiff agreed
to reduce his commission on the sale of defendant’s products. In exchange, the parties agreed
that, if their joint bid was successful, plaintiff would receive an increased profit margin on future
business from Kaiser and the parties would share jointly in all subsequent business with Kaiser.62
The defendant ignored the teaming agreement and submitted its bid to Kaiser independently.
Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and sought an accounting and recovery of lost profits. The
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the
defendant on the grounds of indefiniteness. The court held that, while one “might agree that
unstated future margins and price terms are indefinite, they were necessarily so: it remained to be
seen whether the joint proposal was accepted.”63

Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and their Breach, 9 J.L.Econ.& Org.
98 (1993); J. Thomas & T. Worrall, Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information, 51 J. Econ. Theory 367
(1991); B. Bernheim & M. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 902 (1998).
61

See 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (2001).

62

Specifically, the parties agreed to negotiate precise profit margins and product pricing once the bid was
accepted. Id. at —.
63

107 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 218.
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The court in Krantz identified the key variable that triggers a judicial decision to enforce:
the parties wrote as complete an agreement as they could under the circumstances. The
information that they discarded involved the relationship between the plaintiff’s efforts in
servicing Kaiser under the contract and the defendant’s investment in customized components
suitable for Kaiser. The interaction between these inputs was complex. Both of these interactive
inputs were essential ingredients to the price of the product to Kaiser and to the resulting profits
available for division. Thus, the complexity of the relationship would have increased the
transactions costs of specifying profit margins more concretely. Moreover, neither the plaintiff’s
marketing efforts nor the quality of the defendant’s specialized investment could be verified to a
court. Selecting a contract term that conditions on unverifiable information would have been a
poor fit because it would create moral hazard. When a party cannot observe or verify the value
of a relevant economic parameter, such as effort or quality, that party will reject a contract that
conditions on that parameter because of the risk that the other party will behave strategically 64
Where the incompleteness is predominantly a function of environmental complexity or of
asymmetries, the data show that courts regard the resulting contract as “obligationally complete”
and thus legally enforceable.65
2. Unenforceable Indefinite Agreements
In fifty-five of the sample cases, the appellate court refused to enforce the parties
agreement on the grounds of indefiniteness.66 In a handful of cases, the indefiniteness seemed
clearly to be the product of inadvertence or carelessness on the part of the parties (or their

64

Parties will write a more complete contract covering a specialized investment (such as the efforts of the
plaintiff or the output of the defendant) when (i) they can specify clearly what standards the investment is to meet;
(ii) the investment will meet those standards if undertaken correctly; and (iii) a party can prove to a court that the
product of the investment did or did not satisfy the contractual standards. Krantz shows that these conditions are
sometimes hard to meet. Contracts that compensate a seller on the basis of the quality of the end-product or an agent
on the basis of the value of her efforts or can create efficient incentives only when quality or effort are verifiable. See
generally, Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note —.
65

66

Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note – at —.
See Table 2 infra.
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lawyers) in writing the contract.67 But the bulk of the cases where courts denied enforcement to
indefinite agreements cannot be understood in terms of careless omissions or an inadvertent
failure to negotiate over conditions of performance that were otherwise verifiable. Rather, the
facts support the hypothesis that the parties intentionally and deliberately concluded an agreement
that was indefinite as to key terms that later resulted in litigation. Moreover, unlike the cases of
exogenous incompleteness, in these instances the parties failed to incorporate in their agreement
readily available, verifiable measures of performance. In sum, the parties to these agreements
appear to prefer the indefinite agreement they concluded to the more explicit and verifiable
alternative that they ignored.
Although there are some variations in the cases, two common factual patterns
predominate. This first is the “indefinite bonus contract” such as the agreement at issue in Smith
v. Hammons.68 Smith entered into an agreement with Hammons Entertainment to produce and
perform in a magic show. The parties agreed that Smith would be paid a stipulated salary of
$150,000 in return for using his creative efforts to “design, stage, perform and star in a magic and
music show.” In addition, the agreement specified that if Smith faithfully performed his
obligations Hammons would subsequently pay Smith a signing bonus as well as a share of the
profits from the show. Hammons was disappointed with Smith’s efforts and fired him. Smith
sued for his share of the bonus and lost profits. The court affirmed a summary judgment for
Hammons, holding the bonus agreement too indefinite and thus unenforceable.
The second archetype is a variation on the same theme. Here, the parties enter into what is
traditionally designated an “agreement to agree” and what we might term a “comfort

67

Bulloch South, Inc. v. Gosai, 250 Ga.App. 170, 550 S.E. 2d 750 (2001); Strauss Paper Co, Inc., v. RSA
Executive Search, Inc., 260 A.D.2d 750, 688 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1999); The Don Webster Company, Inc. v. Indian
Western Express, Inc., 161 F.Supp.2d 959 (2001); Kostelnik, Exr., v. Helper, 96 Ohio St. 3d 1, 770 N.E. 2d 58
(2002); Zurich American Insurance Co. v. General Car & Truck Leasing System, Inc, 2002 WL 317206637 (Ga.
App. 2002).
68
63 S.W. 3d 320 (Mo.App.S.D. 2002). Eighteen cases in the sample are coded as “indefinite bonus
contracts.” See Table 2 infra.
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agreement.”69 As an example, in Hunt v. Coker70 the parties entered into an written agreement
expressing their joint desire for Coker to sell and Hunt to buy Coker’s insurance agency. The
document provided for a purchase date and set out several options for the purchase price,
including 45% of the commissions that renew over five years, or 40 % of the commissions that
renew over six years. The agreement provided that Hunt would consolidate his location with
Coker as soon as possible with each party paying his own expenses until the date of sale.
Subsequently, Hunt became unhappy with Coker’s work and informed him that the offer of sale
would not be honored. Hunt sued for breach. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court dismissing the suit on the grounds of indefiniteness. The purchase “options” were not
true options since the parties never agreed that Hunt should have the right to choose among the
designated alternatives and thus the parties never agreed on a stipulated price. Rather, the court
found the agreement akin to an “agreement to agree” and thus unenforceable.
In the cases falling within each of these prototypes, the courts appear most influenced by
the failure of the parties to agree on readily available, verifiable terms. A stipulated bonus for
achieving specific performance standards could easily have been negotiated in Hammons.71 For

69

The analogy is to “comfort letters” that are typically issued by a parent company to a lending institution
and are aimed at encouraging the lender to issue credit to a subsidiary. The letter seeks to assure the lender without
the parent committing itself as a surety or a guarantor. For discussion, see Rene Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort
Letters: The Legal and Business Implications, 104 Banking L. J. 313 (1987); DiMatteo & Rene Sacasas, Credit and
Value Comfort Instruments: Crossing the Line from Assurance to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory
of Enforceability, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 357 (1995). Eleven of the sample cases are coded as “comfort agreements,”
while four others were more formal letters of intent. See Table 2 infra.
70

741 So. 2d 1011 (Miss. App. 1999).

71

See also Larson v. Johnson, 184 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.Me. 2002). In 1995, Johnson asked Larson to
supervise a construction project on his property in Maine. Larson was paid a monthly rate of $6,700 per month
based on the total estimated cost of the project, plus lodging, divided into monthly payments. After completing the
project, Johnson was so pleased with the quality of the work and Larson’s effort that he gave Larsen a $175,000
bonus for doing the job. Thereafter, Johnson permitted Larson to live on the property rent free in exchange for basic
caretaking duties. Subsequently, in 1999, Johnson asked Larson to supervise a further project to construct a
workshop on the property. Larson asked for the same rate ($6,700 per month) as per the prior job. Johnson
responded that he would “take care” of Larson if he would do the project and told him to “trust the Great Oracle”
(meaning Johnson). Larson worked on the shop project in addition to his other duties for over nine months, but upon
asking to be paid at the same rate as the earlier job ($6,700 per month), Johnson fired him. The court held that the
claim to a “bonus” was too indefinite but that Larson’s claim for wages at his earlier rate presented a jury question.
In Larsen, just as in Hammons, the parties failed to exploit any number of commonly used terms to create an
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example, the parties could have conditioned a fixed bonus on predetermined benchmarks or
“deliverables” that are themselves verifiable and serve as proxies for the level of efforts requested
by the promisor.72 Or, alternatively, the parties could have specified an advance against a
percentage of the profits from the magic show as is common in many franchising and licensing
contexts.73 Similarly, in Hunt the parties could have chosen a single method of determining the
purchase price of the agency or granted to one of the parties a real option to select among the
alternative pricing formulae. In both cases, therefore, the parties’ failure to make the agreement
sufficiently definite and thus legally binding seems to have been intentional and deliberate. In
other words, the indefiniteness is endogenous to the contract, and the courts appear to infer from
that fact that the parties either do not intend or do not deserve legal enforcement.
These cases of deliberately incomplete agreements present a genuine puzzle. The sample
data show that courts are uniform in declining to enforce these agreements. And yet relatively
sophisticated parties in business transactions continue to negotiate such agreements in the
shadow of judicial non-enforcement. The behavior appears directly inconsistent with the
assumptions of contract theory which hold that parties will not contract over non-verifiable terms,
but will contract over verifiable terms that can be specified at low cost.
How can we understand these cases? Let’s begin by noting some common features.
These agreements are simple rather than complex, and the commitments made by each promisor
are clear. Thus, the interaction is relatively free from the moral ambiguity that attends complex
interactions. In this respect, these cases are quite unlike those described above where the courts
enforce the incomplete contract. A plausible hypothesis, therefore, is that these contracts are self-

enforceable incentive contract. For example, a specific bonus could have been pegged to desirable effects of
Larson’s efforts–e.g., finishing the job on time or bringing the project in under budget. Or, the parties could have
used a third party , such as an architect, as the arbiter of quality.
72

The stipulation for prescribed “deliverables” is common in many transactional settings, such as, for
example, contracts between architects and their clients.
73
See, e.g, Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524 (1997) (describing the
ubiquitous use of royalty offsets against fixed advances in the entertainment industry).
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enforcing; either the parties are relying on reputational sanctions or on the overhang of repeated
interactions to make their promises credible. Indeed, the similar practice of firms issuing legally
unenforceable “comfort letters” to prospective lenders has been explained as a reputational signal
that makes the agreements self-enforcing.74
But the cases in the sample do not square easily with the common understanding of the
domain of self-enforcing agreements. The transactions represented by the cases are, for the most
part, isolated, one-shot interactions between relative strangers in heterogeneous markets where
reputational constraints are thought to be quite weak.75 In such an environment, reputation alone
is an inadequate means of credibly enforcing promises. Even if others can observe the
interaction, they are unlikely to learn about the true reasons why the particular transaction broke
down. Without moral clarity, the mere fact of breakdown is not sufficient to impose a
reputational cost on either party. If self-enforcement is to be a satisfactory explanation for this
puzzle, therefore, its domain must be significantly larger than is conventionally assumed. In the
discussion that follows in Part II, I evaluate emerging economic theories of reciprocal fairness
that purport to broaden the domain of self-enforcement to include the transactions evidenced in
the data.

II. RECIPROCAL FAIRNESS AS A MEANS OF SELF-ENFORCEMENT
A. Fairness and Rational Choice.
The principle of fairness is entrenched in legal doctrine, including contract doctrine.
Equitable estoppel, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, the doctrine of avoidable consequences,

74

Sacasas & Wiesner, Comfort Letters, supra note --- at 328:
Legally vague promises and inferences from cautious language are not always valueless in
business....Custom shows that memorializing even a weak legal commitment carries some moral
and business weight. The letter can be shown to others , and reputations can be injured by the
writer’s breach of faith....Id.

75
In 67% (37 of 55) of the cases where the courts declined enforcement, the transactions were essentially
discrete, one-shot interactions between relative strangers. See Table 2 infra.
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unconscionability, good faith, reasonableness and reformation are just a few of the contract
doctrines that can be understood in fairness terms. Moreover, most individuals hold strong
notions of fairness that are grounded in a common experience of the social preference for
reciprocity and equality of treatment. But law and economics scholars have largely ignored the
fairness debate. One reason is that the claims of law and economics rest on the predictive power
of rational choice theory, a theory that assumes individuals choose between competing
alternatives based on rational self-interest.
In recent years, two sustained lines of attack have been mounted against rational choice
theory. The first--behavioral decision theory--challenges the rationality assumption, and has
gained much attention among legal scholars.76 There is now substantial evidence that individuals
make systematic cognitive mistakes in laboratory experiments when asked to solve specified
individual decision problems.77 But these experiments do not test a general theory of how people
make decisions and thus they raise an issue of external validity; that is, it is an open question as to
when real world parties will behave as did the experimental subjects.78 For this reason, the legal
implications of behavioral decision theory remain uncertain.79

76
There is an extensive literature traveling under the label of “behavioral law and economics” that builds on
research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. See e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998). For a survey of the literature,
see Daniel C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision-Making in Legal Scholarship: A
Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998).
77

The early seminal work in this field includes Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); same authors, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974); Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic
Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letter 201 (1981) ; same author, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991).
78
See Jessica L. Cohen & William T. Dickens, A Foundation for Behavioral Economics, 92 Amer. Econ.
Rev. 335 (2002) (noting a consequence of the “lack of theoretical foundations [is that] the policy implications of
behavioral economics are limited by an inability to predict circumstances in which anomalous behavior will arise
(other than in those sorts of circumstances in which it has been observed before) or how it will respond to policy
changes.”).
79

For a recent and extremely thorough analysis of the psychological literature and a skeptical view of its
relevance for the law, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1907 (2002); same author, Why Law and Economics
Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics Equal Incompetency, 91 Geo. L. J. —
(2002).
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The second critique, which has received much less attention, accepts rationality as a first
order approximation of individual choice, but challenges the claim that all individuals are
exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. Recent work in experimental economics has
provided robust evidence that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and
reciprocity.80 This evidence implies that a substantial fraction of people behave as if they are
motivated by fairness concerns as well as by self-interest.81 If people differ in regard to how
selfishly or fairmindedly they behave, this difference has important economic and legal
consequences. In particular, the social preferences for reciprocity and equality of treatment are
the strongest candidates for developing a theory that expands the range of self-enforcing contracts
to include isolated interactions between relative strangers.
B. The Empirical Evidence: The Heterogeneity of Fairness and Self-Interest
The empirical challenge to the self-interest hypothesis began in the 1980s when
experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining games in controlled laboratory
settings. One of the games that produced the most dramatic evidence of social preferences other

80

See e.g., M. Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1281
(1993); D.K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 Rev. Econ. Dynam. 593 (1998); Armin
Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity, Institute for Empirical Research, Working Paper #6 (1998); Martin
Dufwenberg & Georg Kirshsteiger, A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, Mimeo, CentER, Tilburg University (1998);
Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. Econ. 817 (1999);
Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter, & Georg Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental
Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833 (1997). For a review of the literature, see Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological
Foundations of Incentives, University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper #95
(2001). Despite the experimental results, rational choice theorists are reluctant to abandon the self-interest
assumption. One reason is that this assumption has been quite successful in providing accurate predictions in some
economic domains. For example, models based on self-interest make very good predictions about the behavior of
parties in competitive markets. There is a further, methodological, reason. Changing assumptions about preferences
makes it much more difficult to generate testable hypotheses because phenomena can then be explained by assuming
the “right” preferences. The experimental evidence suggests, however, that this convention may no longer make
much sense.
81

Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic
Applications, University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper # 75 2-3 (2001).
The experimental findings are robust as to the experimental subjects, but the relevance of this data for the general
population raises the separate question of external validity. See discussion Part II(E), infra.
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than self-interest was the Ultimatum Game.82 In the Ultimatum Game, a pair of subjects,
separated from each other, must anonymously agree on the division of a fixed sum of money (say
$100). Party A (the Proposer) makes a single proposal of how to divide the amount. Party B (the
Responder) can either accept or reject the proposal. If B accepts, then each takes away their
respective sums. If B rejects, then both get nothing. Under the standard assumptions of rational
choice, there is a Nash equilibrium in which A proposes the smallest money unit available (say
$1) and B accepts. This result obtains because A knows that B is rational and self-interested and
thus will always prefer something to nothing. Since B will accept even the smallest amount, A
who is also rational and self-interested will propose it in order to maximize her own pay off.
The Ultimatum Game has been tested in various settings with relatively large sums of
money (in some experiments the amount represents more than three month’s income for the
participants) and the robust result is directly contradictory to the self-interest hypothesis.83 The
evidence shows that any proposal less than 20% of the amount will be rejected with a 50%
probability. Moreover, the probability of rejection decreases as the initial offer increases.84 Thus,
it seems clear that many responders do not behave in a self-interested, maximizing manner. They
are prepared to reject offers they perceive as unfair even at a cost to themselves. A further robust
result is that many proposers seem to anticipate that very low offers will be rejected with a high
probability. This result has been confirmed by experiments in another simple game, the Dictator
Game, in which the Responder has no choice but must accept the Proposer’s offer. Results show
that initial offers in the Ultimatum Game are substantially higher than in the Dictator Game,
indicating that proposers apply backward induction and anticipate retaliation against unfair
82
The seminal paper is Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.. Econ. Behav. & Org. 367 (1982). In addition to the Ultimatum Game, other games
were developed to test the self-interest hypothesis, including the Gift Exchange Game, the Trust Game and the
Dictator Game. All of these games have the salient feature of simplicity. Since the games are easy for experimental
subjects to understand, the inferences to be drawn regarding their motivations are more robust.
83

Elisabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith, On Expectations and Monetary Stakes in
Ultimatum Games, 25 Int’l J.of Game Theory 289 (1996); Ernst Fehr & Elena Tougareva, Do High Money Stakes
Remove Reciprocal Fairness, Mimeo, Institute for Empirical Research, University of Zurich (1995);
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Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J.of Econ. Pers.209
(1995); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECON. (1995).
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proposals.85
The Ultimatum Game shows that a substantial fraction of individuals will punish unfair
behavior. Another game, the Gift Exchange Game, has shown that a substantial fraction of
responders are willing to reward actions that are perceived as generous or fair.86 In the Gift
Exchange Game, the Proposer offers a sum of money between 1 and 10 units (imagine that it is a
salary offer). The Responder can either accept or reject the offer. If she rejects both subjects
receive nothing. If the Responder accepts, she must then expend some amount of effort (think of
it as job performance) that is costly to her. Standard rational choice theory predicts an
equilibrium in which the Responder will always choose the lowest possible effort level (why try
any harder than you have to when effort is costly). Anticipating this, the Proposer will always
propose the lowest possible salary offer. But again, the results directly contradict the self-interest
hypothesis. All of the studies confirm that the average effort is positively correlated to the offered
wage. This implies that responders, on average, reward generous salary offers with generous
efforts (even when it is costly for them to do so).87
These experiments yield two important conclusions. First, the data show that the subjects
in these experiments are heterogeneous: some individuals cooperate voluntarily and some do not.
In all of these games, the data is remarkably robust in showing considerable individual differences
among the subjects. Thus, for, example, while there are a significant fraction of responders in the
Gift Exchange Game who repay generous offers with generous efforts (the data across
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experiments is remarkably consistent that about 40% are “fair” types), there is also a substantial
fraction (again consistently ranging between 40 and 60%) who always make purely selfish effort
choices.88 But despite the presence of heterogeneous responders (some fair, some selfish), the
fraction of fair responders is sufficiently high to make a high salary offer profitable to the
proposer.
Second, it is important to emphasize that the interactions in all of these games are oneshot, isolated exchanges. The subjects do not know each other and only interact once,
anonymously. Thus, the behaviors that are revealed in the experiments, especially the preference
for reciprocity held by a fraction of the subjects, must be distinguished from patterns of
cooperation that are revealed in iterated games. Patterns of cooperation and investment in
reputation in ongoing relationships are perfectly consistent with self-interest; on the other hand,
reciprocity in one shot interactions directly contradicts the self-interested hypothesis.
C. Toward a Theory of Reciprocal Fairness.
Can the results of these experiments be explained in a rational choice framework by
relaxing the assumption that all individuals are exclusively motivated by self-interest? One
approach is to focus on the distributional effects of any interaction. There are several candidates
for a theory of fairness among this “social preferences” approach.89 Thus, for example, one can
hypothesize that some fraction of parties are motivated by altruism; that is, that their utility
increases with the well-being of other people. Altruism explains the generous behavior of
responders in gift exchange games, but it is clearly inconsistent with the evidence that some
players retaliate and hurt other subjects even when it is costly for them to do so.90 An alternative
hypothesis is that some subjects are motivated by envy; that is, they care not only about their
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absolute wealth but also about their relative standing as compared to others.91 This preference for
envy is just the opposite of altruism. It means that a player suffers if she gets less than the other
party but doesn’t care about the other if she gets more. Thus, while envy explains retaliation in
ultimatum and gift exchange games, it does not explain the generous behavior in those
interactions.
Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt have developed a theory of inequity aversion that captures
the key results in the experimental games and combines the features of both altruism and envy.92
Under this theory, a person is altruistic to other players if her payoffs are above an equitable
benchmark and is envious of the others if their payoffs exceed that benchmark. In other words,
people compare themselves with others in their group (and with the other player in two person
games) by using a benchmark of equality of distribution. Inequity aversion thus can rationalize
positive and negative actions toward other people.
A second approach to the fairness problem focuses not on the distributional effects of an
interaction but on the intent that can be inferred from those effects. This “intention-based
reciprocity” assumes that a person cares about the intentions of the other party to a bilateral
interaction. If the other party treats her kindly then she wants to return the favor, but if the other
party treats her unfairly, then she acts to punish unfair behavior. Thus, in this approach, the key is
how a person interprets the actions of the other party.93 Intuitively, it would seem that the
intention to be fair plays an important role in many facets of life, independent of the distributive
consequences themselves. And indeed, recent experiments provide clear support for the
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behavioral relevance of the intent of the actor.94 These experiments show that, in judging the
fairness of an action, individuals not only take into account the distributive consequences of an
action but also the intention that is signaled by the action.95 Both factors are germane. In a world
without signals of intent there is still evidence of reciprocity, but the level of reciprocity is
significantly enhanced where the actor can infer the intention of the other player.96
Let’s summarize, then, the key elements in formulating a theory of reciprocal fairness that
is consistent with this substantial body of experimental evidence: First, many individuals deviate
from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity means that in response
to friendly actions, many individuals are much more cooperative than predicted by the axioms of
rational choice. Conversely, in response to hostile actions many individuals are much more nasty
and vengeful. Second, individuals repay gifts and take revenge even in interactions with complete
strangers and even if it is costly for them and yields neither present nor future material rewards.
Finally, this is a heterogeneous world. Some individuals exhibit reciprocal fairness and others
exhibit pure self-interest. Taking all the experiments together from such diverse countries as
Austria, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Russia and the United States, the fraction of reciprocally fair
subjects ranges from 40 to 60% as does the fraction of subjects who are selfish.97
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D. Testing Reciprocal Fairness in Incomplete Contracts
What, then, does a theory of reciprocal fairness tell us about the optimal design of
contracts? To see its relevance, consider the following example. Assume that a retailer in New
York is interested in acquiring a single shipment of the highest quality carved rosewood furniture-coffee tables, trunks, chests, etc.-- from India. The buyer anticipates using this shipment in a one
shot promotion of luxury home furnishings that it is planning for the holiday season. In a perfect
world, the buyer would visit a market in New York, survey the imported rosewood and purchase
the highest quality at the price prevailing for such goods. Unfortunately, no such market exits, so
the buyer must contract to purchase the furniture from a seller in India. The buyer has never dealt
with the seller before and doesn’t anticipate doing so again.
There are two alternative contracts the buyer might propose. One option is to propose an
obligationally complete contract (that is, a contract in which the parties condition performance on
all verifiable information and only discard non-verifiable information). Assume that high quality
can be observed but not verified to a court, but that a court is able to verify that the goods do not
meet merchantable quality. In other words, a court can determine that the delivered quality is
unacceptable under that legal standard.98 This option thus requires the buyer to specify the
quantity of furniture required, set a quality level of ordinary merchantability and propose to pay
the market price commensurate with that quality (say $50,000). This contract is legally
enforceable and, should the Indian seller fail to deliver merchantable quality goods, the buyer can
recover expectation damages (although costs and attorneys fees would not be recouped).
Moreover, since the seller will charge the market price for merchantable quality goods, much of
the contractual surplus (representing the value to the buyer of having goods of at least
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merchantable quality for its promotion) is retained by the buyer.
There is a second option. The buyer can instead write an intentionally indefinite contract.
This contract proposes a lower base price (say, $40,000) for goods that are sold “As Is,” subject
only to a minimum contract description.99 In addition, the buyer promises to pay a bonus of as
much as $20,000 if the seller delivers high quality goods satisfactory to the buyer. Here, in other
words, the buyer is offering potentially to share a portion of the greater contractual surplus with
the seller in return for the enhanced effort necessary to produce the specialized goods that
maximize the buyer’s value. But this proposal has a twist. The base price term in this incomplete
contract would be enforceable (assuming seller delivered goods meeting the contract description),
but under the common law indefiniteness doctrine, neither any additional effort expended by the
seller nor the buyer’s promise to give a bonus if satisfied is legally enforceable. Thus, there is a
risk that the buyer will deliver poor quality goods for a $40,000 price (which is the lowest value
contract for the buyer).
Which contract will maximize the expected contractual surplus? It is tempting to suggest
that the obligationally complete contract, with a legally enforceable quality term, is on average
more likely to maximize expected joint returns. While the first best efficient contract would
have the seller deliver high value goods at a contract price of $60,000, the downside risk is that
the seller will deliver low quality, low value goods for $40,000. This risk exists because the
indefinite contract precludes a legal action against the seller should it deliver low quality goods
that meet the contract specifications. Since high quality is not verifiable, the first best option is
not contractible. The only legally enforceable contract for quality is the second best option of
merchantable goods at a $50,000 price.

99

Under an “As Is” contract, the seller makes no warranties of quality (see UCC §2-316(3)(a)), but the seller
is responsible for delivering goods meeting the basic contract description (e.g., “six rosewood tables, four carved
trunks,” etc.,). See UCC §2-313(1)(b) (express warranties are created by any description of the goods which is made
part of the basis of the bargain). Comment 4 to §2-313 explains that a clause generally disclaiming all warranties of
quality under §2-316 (such as an “as is” disclaimer) cannot reduce the seller’s obligation to supply goods sufficient
to meet the contract description.

31

This conclusion is strongly supported by rational choice theory. A game theorist would
predict that under the indefinite bonus contract the Indian seller will deliver goods that meet the
verifiable contract description (in order to recover the $40,000 contract price) but will choose a
low effort level thus delivering lower quality goods. This is because expending extra effort in
producing higher quality goods is costly and the extra effort will not earn a compensating bonus
payment. The bonus promise is discretionary and thus a self-interested buyer will always decline
to pay any bonus regardless of the efforts expended by the seller.
But do these predictions hold if preferences for fairness and reciprocity are taken into
account? The more complete, legally enforceable contract aims at a rather unfair distribution of
the surplus. If the Indian seller is concerned about this, she could punish the buyer in two ways.
First, as in an ultimatum game, she could simply reject the contract in which case both parties
would receive a zero payoff. Second, the seller could accept the contract but punish the buyer’s
unfairness by shirking on the effort to produce merchantable quality goods, thus necessitating
costly litigation to enforce the agreement. On the other hand, the very same preferences for
fairness and reciprocity would actually enhance the performance of the more incomplete contract.
A fair buyer in this situation will reciprocate a high effort level from the seller by paying a
generous bonus. Moreover, assuming that the fraction of fair types in the general population is
consistent with the experimental evidence, the probability of a fair bonus being paid is
sufficiently great to motivate the seller (regardless of its type) to expend the extra effort. Thus, if
a substantial fraction of the population responds to opportunities to reciprocate, we would predict
that the indefinite bonus contract would actually produce a better result for both parties than the
more complete, legally enforceable contract.100
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This result can be stated formally. Assume that 0 # " #1 of the buyer population are fair types, in the
sense that these buyers will reciprocate a fair offer from the seller and comply with their promises even if the
promises are legally unenforceable. Sellers know ", but do not know whether the particular buyer they face is fair or
unfair. The buyer’s valuation for the product is v drawn from the distribution {vl, ... vh}, with associated prices pl,
etc. The contract should be written only when it would be socially efficient, which is when it would generate greater
surplus:
. The seller’s cost for producing high quality is c and the cost of producing low
quality is normalized to zero. Recalling that quality is observable, the buyer offers the following contract:
I. pl + (ph - pl) = ph for qh
II. pl for ql.
The bonus is ph - pl, which the fair buyer pays when the seller delivers high quality. Since quality is unverifiable, the
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What do the experimental results show? Fehr, Klein and Schmidt have designed an
experiment involving a single interaction that tests the choice between an incomplete bonus
contract that relies on reciprocity and a more complete incentive contract that monitors
performance under the threat of costly legal enforcement.101 In the experiment, each principal
was matched randomly and anonymously with a different agent. The principal had to choose
between an incomplete contract, where the initial wage offer was enforceable but both effort and
bonus were discretionary, and a more complete contract with explicit incentives for effort and
enforceable (and costly) sanctions for nonperformance.102 Ninety percent of the principals chose

unfair buyer will pay only pl regardless of what the seller delivers.
Now consider the seller’s problem when a buyer offers this contract. The seller will produce high quality
when
The first term on the left hand side is the expected gain from a fair buyer (the probability a buyer is fair times the
high quality price); the second term is the expected gain from a cheating seller; and the third term is the cost of high
quality. The seller can produce low quality costlessly and get the low price, which is the right hand side. This
simplifies to
The left hand side is the expected marginal gain from producing high quality and the right hand side is the cost.
Rearranging terms, the seller will produce high quality when

Holding constant the percentage of fair buyers, sellers are more likely to produce high quality when the cost of doing
so is low - c is small – and when the premium that buyers will pay for high quality is large (the denominator is large).
And holding the right hand side constant, sellers are more likely to produce high quality when the fraction of fair
buyers is high (" is large). Assuming contracting costs are zero, all buyers will offer the contract described here.
This is because the fair buyer is happy to pay for high quality and the unfair buyer is happy to cheat if he gets high
quality. So ex ante the contract is in every buyer’s self interest; only fair buyers will comply, however. Second, the
seller is not trusting the buyer with whom she deals. Rather, she is making a profit maximizing decision given her
knowledge of the percentage of fair buyers and the other parameters. So sellers will sometimes produce high quality
and sometimes not.
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the bonus contract. Some principals did not pay a bonus, but a significant fraction did respond
generously to higher levels of effort from the agents by paying an appropriate bonus. Thus, the
average bonus increased significantly and proportionately with the level of effort provided. This
made it worthwhile for agents (whether fair or selfish) to put forth much greater effort than the
self-interest hypothesis would predict. Indeed, the average amount of effort induced by the bonus
contract was 2½ times that which was induced by the explicit, legally enforceable contract. Thus,
on average, the incomplete bonus contract produced a much higher average payoff to both
parties.103
These experiments demonstrate that powerful incentives can be stimulated in a very
incomplete contract between total strangers who may never interact again. Rather than using
explicit sanctions, the incomplete contract relies on reciprocal fairness as an enforcement device.
Importantly, the incomplete contract does better precisely because it is incomplete and thus leaves
more freedom for the parties to reciprocate. By simply assuming the presence of a substantial
fraction of reciprocally fair individuals, this anomalous result becomes predictable: The indefinite
bonus contract will produce an outcome significantly closer to the first best objective than will the
more complete, legally enforceable contract. To be sure, this enforcement mechanism is not
perfect and, depending on the fraction of reciprocal types in the population, it can fail. Yet the
experimental evidence strongly suggests that the effect of reciprocal fairness, an effect that thus
far has been neglected in contract theory, is an important element in optimal contract design.

of effort. At stage three, the principal observes the actual effort. If the principal has chosen the implicit contract, he
then decides whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. If the principal offered the explicit contract and the
agent’s effort falls short of the agreed level, a random draw decides with probability 1/3 whether shirking is
verifiable, in which case the agent has to pay the fine. If all players are purely self-interested there is a
straightforward result. A selfish principal never pays a bonus. Anticipating this, the agent only provides the
minimum effort of 1. If the principal chooses the explicit contract, the principal should choose the maximum fine
because this is the best deterrent against potential shirking. The parameters of the experiment are chosen such that a
risk neutral and selfish agent maximizes expected utility by choosing an effort level of 4 if faced with the maximum
fine. Since the enforceable effort level is only 1 under the implicit contract, the model predicts that principals prefer
the explicit contract. Id at 5-8.
103

The more complete, explicit contract produces a lower payoff, all else equal, because shirking is costly to
monitor, verify and sanction. The bonus contract stimulates greater efforts from agents because a principal’s
promise to pay a conditional bonus is credible and principals incur no enforcement costs. Id. at 20.
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E. A Critique of Fairness Theory: Issues of External Validity
Notwithstanding the predictive power of reciprocal fairness in experimental settings, the
theory has yet to be seriously tested in real world contexts. Thus, any use of fairness theory still
raises the question of external validity: To what extent do the experimental results predict how
economic actors will behave in the real world? There are four major challenges to the validity of
this evidence in explaining real world contracting behavior and in formulating legal policy. First
is the question of whether the stakes in experimental games are sufficiently high to simulate the
response of real world actors in commercial contracts. It seems intuitively plausible, for example,
that a preference for reciprocal fairness may become weaker when the monetary stakes are higher.
Despite that intuition, however, experiments with relatively high stakes have shown similar
patterns of reciprocity. Lisa Cameron tested the impact of high stakes on negative reciprocity
(the willingness to punish unfair behavior) with subjects in Indonesia. In a high stakes Ultimatum
Game (representing over three months income to the subjects), she found no variation in
proposers initial offers and only a slight increase in the acceptance rate of low offers by
responders.104
More recently, experiments in Russia in a Gift Exchange Game have tested the impact of
high stakes on positive reciprocity (the willingness to reward fair behavior). In these experiments,
the subjects earned on average between two and three month’s income. The study found that a
ten-fold increase in the size of the stakes had little impact on either the initial wage offer of the
“employers” or the reciprocal effort levels of the “workers.”105 It is possible, of course, that
experiments with extremely high stakes would reveal greater deviations from the predictions of
fairness theory, but, absent that data, a casual review of the relative size of the contractual surplus
in the sample cases does not suggest that the real world stakes would, by themselves, undermine
the theory.
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The second critique of the experimental evidence is particularly relevant to the use of
fairness theory to explain the behavior of contracting parties. All of the experimental subjects are
individuals and not firms. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the observed behaviors, even if they
apply to the general population, are relevant to contracts between business entities. One might
speculate, for example, that individuals in laboratory experiments may respond differently than
officers of firms because the experimental subjects are not subject to the same pressures to make
profit maximizing decisions. Moreover, some recent evidence suggests that behavioral anomalies
can be substantially mitigated or made to disappear when individuals are asked to perform as
actors in firms,106 or when the applicable institutions permit communication within a group of
actors and require competition between groups.107 It is important to know the nature of the
contracting parties in any particular transaction, therefore, before reciprocal fairness can be
advanced confidently as an explanation for the observed behavior. As Table 2 shows, 50% of the
unenforceable agreements in the sample involved either individuals or sole proprietors on both
sides of the transaction, and in 75% of the cases, one of the parties was either an individual or a
sole proprietor. In only ten cases were both litigants large corporate entities. Thus, the
contracting behaviors observed in the cases reflect, in general, the preferences of individual actors
and not those of corporate officers acting in an agency capacity.
The third objection to generalizing these findings to real world contracting behavior is that
the subjects (who are typically university undergraduates) may be playing a different game than
that of real world actors. For instance, the fair behavior that is observed in the experiments might
be driven by the fact that the experimenters can observe the subjects actions and students may not
want to appear selfish or greedy to their professors. But this speculation seems inconsistent with
the basic finding of heterogeneity. There are, after all, significant individual differences
observed in the subjects behavior. The substantial fraction of subjects who exhibit selfish
behavior seem unconcerned about their professors opinions. Moreover, when experimenters
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conducted a gift
exchange game where effort levels were set exogenously, the wage offers were uniformly
“unfair” and approached the predictions of the self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that any
concern with appearing selfish is rather easily overcome.108
In the same vein, however, one might ask whether experimentally-observed reciprocal
fairness is evidence of a universal pattern of behavior or whether an individual’s economic and
social background may influence her preferences for fairness. And, if so, is reciprocal behavior
better explained by an individual’s attributes (sex, age or relative wealth) or by the attributes of
the group or culture to which she belongs? A recent cross-cultural study using the Ultimatum
Game in fifteen small-scale societies found that the self-interest hypothesis fails in each society
studied.109 But the study did show significant cross-cultural differences, both in the equity of
offers and the rate of rejections. The findings suggest that observed differences are attributable to
group-specific conditions such as social institutions or cultural fairness norms. Specifically, the
study shows that the greater the payoff from cooperation in economic production for people in the
society and the more those people rely on market exchange in their daily lives the greater the
degree of fairness behaviors (e.g., cooperation, sharing and punishment).110 This last study is
relevant to an inquiry into the causes of deliberately incomplete contracts; it suggests that
contracts written in advanced market economies will exhibit high levels of reciprocal fairness
behaviors. The higher the fraction of fair types in the population, all else equal, the more efficient
is reciprocal fairness as a means of contract enforcement.
The final objection is related to this last point. The experimental evidence does not show
whether observed preferences for reciprocity are inherent characteristics or learned behaviors or
whether they simply represent the failure of self-interested parties to adapt cooperative behavior
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that works well in repeated interactions to one-shot laboratory interactions. After all, individuals
decision strategies have to work in real-world transactions and not in economics experiments. So
it would be hardly surprising if individuals devise strategies --or heuristics--that do work in realworld transactions, and then fail to adjust those strategies to the pure single iteration game in the
laboratory. Or, to put it another way, rather than being equally divided between self-interested
individuals and reciprocally fair ones, the world may be divided between self-interested
individuals who know how to adjust their life strategies in laboratory games and those who don’t.
Another possibility is that cultures generate norms of reciprocity that tend to promote
one’s self-interest. People adhere to the norms because they believe in them as norms, but the
norms themselves are consistent with self-interest, except in laboratory experiments. This is
because, over time, parties will be better off if they behave fairly. Following the “over time”
heuristic consistently, not making distinctions for what appear to be single-iteration games, may
be a successful, maximizing strategy. After all, sometimes one might mistake a repeat-play game
for a single-iteration game and get punished, or one might pay some reputational price that he
didn’t expect, and so on. Thus, it is possible that a rational utility-maximizer could easily behave
in the way the experimental economists describe as reciprocally fair (and not utility-maximizing)
simply because the economists are not thinking about the costs of categorizing, and miscategorizing, transactions. In short, there may be, in fact, no clear conflict between self-interest
and the participants’ observed behavior. Reciprocal fairness may not undermine the self-interest
hypothesis as much as extend its reach.
This argument is quite plausible, indeed, even persuasive, but for the purposes of
understanding self-enforcing agreements it is irrelevant. The important point is that all the
available evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of individuals act as if they were
reciprocally fair in isolated interactions with relative strangers. Whatever the source of that
behavior (whether learned, normative, or intrinsic), it is quite relevant to understanding the
contracting choices of real world individuals in developed market economies who write
intentionally incomplete contracts. The apparent congruence between the experimental evidence
and the factual context of the litigated cases thus justifies a further analysis in Part III of the fit
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between the predictions of fairness theory and the observed behavior of contracting parties.

III. EXPLAINING INTENTIONALLY INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS
Let’s turn now to the central question that the evidence of reciprocal fairness poses for the
legal regulation of indefinite agreements. Assume, for the moment, that the experimental
evidence of a heterogenous world populated by both self-interested and reciprocally fair
individuals accurately captures the external reality. Based on that assumption, can we provide
convincing answers for two fundamental questions: Why do parties write intentionally incomplete
agreements? And, is the presumption of nonenforcement reflected in the common law rule of
indefiniteness justifiable?
A. Why do Parties Write Intentionally Incomplete Contracts?
The sample case data suggest that the incidence of intentionally incomplete agreements is
significant. Roughly 240 cases were litigated to an appellate court over a four year period and
40% of the sample cases consisted of intentionally incomplete agreements. The incidence of
litigation might be explained in several ways. One hypothesis is that the failure to write legally
enforceable contracts in transactions of this type actually increases the risk of litigation and thus
the sample represents a larger fraction of the population of such contracts than would be the case
with litigation over otherwise enforceable contracts. This hypothesis implies that there is a
selection bias: the litigated cases are more likely to require complex moral judgments about the
nature of the promisor’s obligations and the conditions precedent to performance. Thus, the
parties are unable to settle their dispute because of fundamental disagreements about the nature of
their respective commitments. But this hypothesis is inconsistent with the data from the sample
cases that show that these agreements are relatively simple in form, clear in commitment and thus
free from moral ambiguity.
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An alternative hypothesis is that parties write these indefinite agreements because they
are a more efficient method of contracting than the alternative. The efficiency hypothesis
implies that these agreements are ubiquitous and that the litigated cases, representing instances
where the transaction broke down, are a relatively smaller set of the total population of such
agreements than would be the case with litigation over enforceable contracts.111 This efficiency
hypothesis is inconsistent with the basic axioms of contract theory that contracting parties do not
contract over non-verifiable measures of performance and, conversely, do contract over verifiable
measures of performance where transactions costs are relatively low. The cases indicate just the
opposite: Contracting parties frequently discard readily available verifiable measures of
performance in favor of agreements that condition on non-verifiable measures. Theorists have
proposed several possible explanations for why parties might not contract over some verifiable
factors. An obvious possibility is that the transactions costs of specifying all the possible
verifiable states of the world may exceed any expected benefits.112 But transaction costs do not
explain the experimental results discussed above in Part II(D) where subjects who can costlessly
elect legal enforcement of verifiable terms instead choose unenforceable bonus agreements.113
To unravel the puzzle, it is helpful to remember that the axioms of contract theory are
premised on the assumption that the contract in question falls outside of the self-enforcing range.
Thus, verifiability is relevant only when legal enforcement is necessary in order to make the
parties promises credible. The puzzle of intentionally incomplete agreements can be solved,
therefore, if these agreements are self-enforcing and if the self-enforcing mechanism is more
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efficient than the alternative of legal enforcement.114 But most of the sample cases of
intentionally indefinite contracts appear to fall outside the self-enforcing range as that domain is
traditionally understood. The transactions are predominantly one-shot interactions between
“relative” strangers.115 A number of the cases do involve parties with some prior association and
with a prospect of repeat transactions in the future, but reputation and repeat dealings appear, by
themselves, insufficient to ensure that the agreement will be honored.116 The question, then, is
whether reciprocal fairness is sufficient, either by itself or in combination with reputation and
repeat play, to make the respective promises credible.
1. Reciprocal Fairness and Indefinite Bonus Agreements.
Consider the “indefinite bonus agreements” discussed earlier in Part I(D)2. Recall that
the cases reflect a recurring pattern where a principal offers an agent a base compensation and
requests an additional, non-verifiable performance in return for the promise of a non-verifiable
bonus. To make a persuasive case for reciprocal fairness (given our empirical assumptions), we
need to resolve several subsidiary questions. First, if the parties do not intend their agreements to
be legally enforceable, why do they invest resources in negotiating these agreements, frequently
reducing their respective promises to a signed writing? To be sure, a promise made by a
reciprocally fair person is inherently credible and thus worth bargaining for. Such a person has a
114
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social preference for fairness and is prepared to bear costs to achieve an equitable outcome
between the parties. But both fair and selfish parties will make the same promises. The bonus
offer itself is thus not a signal of one’s type (fair or selfish) because both fair and selfish
principals will promise the same bonus.117 Nevertheless, given the assumption of heterogeneity
(e.g., @ 40% of the population is reciprocally fair), the promise of a bonus is not cheap talk. The
bonus promise is ex ante credible since there is a positive probability of a substantial bonus.
Thus, the agent, whether fair or selfish, will exert non-verifiable effort equal to the expected value
of the bonus.118
This argument implies that parties to these agreements do not intend legal enforcement as
a secondary deterrent if the transaction breaks down. If not, then why do they sue? One answer
to this question requires us to recall the Fehr and Schmidt theory of inequity aversion. Under
their theory, fair types have a social preference for equality of treatment which implies a
willingness to share gains from trade as well as a willingness to bear costs in order to punish
inequity. Reciprocally fair people, in other words, are not wimps. They punish selfish behavior.
Even though there is an positive ex ante probability of reciprocity, the assumed proportion of
selfish people in the population implies that it will be necessary to mete out punishment from time
to time. Since both fair and selfish agents will exert some non-verifiable effort to earn a bonus,119
the theory implies that breakdown will most often occur when selfish principals fail to pay a
bonus earned by non-verifiable performance. This inference supports a testable prediction:
litigation occurs primarily when a selfish principal fails to pay a bonus that the agent has earned
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by non-verifiable performance. In such a case, fair agents will be willing to bear costs in order to
punish the principal. A fair agent will be willing to sue even when the expected value of litigation
is negative.120 The evidence from the sample cases is consistent with this prediction. In each of
the indefinite bonus cases, the plaintiff is an agent suing her principal for breach of contract and
claiming the right to a bonus earned by a non-verifiable performance.121
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the parties to these agreements understand ex
ante that there is such a low probability of enforcement if the transaction breaks down. These are
not agreements where the parties have expressly announced their intention not to be legally
bound.122 Rather, the nature of these agreements–simple, clear undertakings to treat the other
party fairly–suggest that the parties are relying on the potency of reciprocity rather than on the
absence of legal enforcement per se. Thus, a more plausible hypothesis is that, from the parties
perspective, the ex ante prospect of legal enforcement is ambiguous. After all, a review of the
cases would suggest to any lawyer that sometimes indefinite contracts are enforced and
sometimes they are not. In the absence of a systematic, functional analysis, of the sort I have
undertaken in this Article, there is no reason to believe that the distinction between deliberately
incomplete agreements and other relational contracts is obvious to the parties who are planning
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these transactions. By electing to leave the question of legal enforcement ambiguous, the parties
increase the credibility of the threat of punishment should a selfish principal fail to pay a bonus to
a deserving agent.
The discussion thus far suggests that reciprocal fairness offers a superior contracting
alternative to legal enforcement even in one-shot interactions between relative strangers. The
experimental evidence supports three reasons why a self-enforcing bonus agreement is more
efficient than a legally enforceable contract that conditions only on verifiable measures of
performance. First, legal enforcement is significantly more costly than self-enforcement. Second,
reciprocal fairness allows the parties to make credible promises regarding non-verifiable measures
of performance, thus increasing joint surplus. In the case of the indefinite bonus agreement, the
principal has two opportunities to encourage reciprocity – by increasing the initial base
compensation and by promising a bonus. Finally, these self-enforcing bonus agreements may help
to solve a multi-tasking problem in instances where the agent’s performance involves both
verifiable and non-verifiable tasks. Holmstrom and Milgram argue that, in multi-tasking contexts,
a flat wage rate for all tasks is more efficient than a more complete contract that links
compensation to verifiable tasks.123 This is because linking verifiable performance measures to
compensation will cause the agent to substitute away from the non-verifiable tasks to the
compensated verifiable tasks thus impairing overall performance. Self-enforcing bonus
agreements may avoid this inefficient effort allocation across tasks because the actual bonus can
be made dependant on the performance of the agents in all tasks.124
2. Reciprocal Fairness and Repeated Interactions as Self-Enforcing Complements.
Even if self-enforcing bonus contracts are more efficient on average than legally
enforceable contracts that condition only on verifiable performance, the assumption of
heterogeneity nevertheless implies a higher variance in the returns for the self-enforcing
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alternative. If the parties are risk neutral, the variance will not matter and they would predictably
choose the more efficient contract. But one might expect many of the individual contracting
parties in the sample to be risk averse.125 The puzzle, then, is why might individual contractors
strongly prefer the indefinite bonus alternative?126 One plausible hypothesis is that even though
cooperative patterns based on reputation and repeated interactions may be weak in any particular
case, individuals learn to reciprocate because reciprocation pays off in so many ongoing
transactions over time. This suggests that cooperative behavior is self-reinforcing. Successful
cooperation that generates a reputation for trustworthiness or produces returns in ongoing
transactions is consistent with self-interest and also causes parties to learn to care more about the
other’s payoff. This, in turn, strengthens an individual’s willingness to reciprocate voluntarily
even where the prospect of repeat dealings is quite low.127
Moreover, in the transactions represented by the sample cases, other cooperative influences
are clearly present to some degree even if they may not be sufficient by themselves to make the
promises credible. Here the hypothesis is that the various self-enforcing mechanisms--reputation,
repeated interactions and reciprocity--are complements. There is some experimental evidence that
supports this claim. Brown, Falk and Fehr compared the effort levels of agents in a one-shot Gift
Exchange Game with the effort levels in a similar game in which repeated interaction was an
additional, material incentive.128 They found that effort levels in the one-shot interaction was
above the level predicted by pure self-interest (thus implying a significant fraction of reciprocal
agents) but that the repeated interaction condition caused a significant increase in the effort level.
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It is not entirely clear why this complementarity exists between repeated interactions and
reciprocal fairness. One conjecture is that the properties of incentives created by repeated
interactions are very similar to the properties of incentives created by invitations to reciprocate.
Both self-enforcing incentives are imposed implicitly and ex post while the incentives created by
legal enforcement are imposed explicitly and ex ante.129 Thus, for example, in a repeat game
framework a principal can punish a selfish agent ex post without risking offending a cooperator by
announcing in advance a sanction for inadequate efforts.
Casual empiricism supports the hypothesis that self-enforcing mechanisms are
complements and, especially in multi-tasking contexts, may motivate parties to write indefinite
bonus contracts. Perhaps the most prevalent example of such contracts is in academic
employment. Many, if not most, academic employment contracts resemble the indefinite bonus
agreements described above. The principal (say, a law school dean) makes a legally binding base
salary offer to the agent (the individual faculty). The salary is invariant to levels of effort above a
bare minimum verifiable performance (typically acts of moral turpitude or complete failure of
performance). But many verifiable measures of performance are discarded (e.g., maintaining
elemental teaching competence, prompt performance of specific governance responsibilities and
participation in the intellectual life of the institution). At the same time, the principal requests
additional non-verifiable performance (quality research, devoted attention to teaching and shared
governance responsibilities, etc.) and promises an indefinite bonus (merit raises in the future).
Both the enhanced performance and the bonus are indefinite terms and thus are not legally
enforceable under the common law rule.
The standard academic contract is, therefore, largely self-enforcing. Clearly, self-interested
cooperation makes the respective promises at least partially credible. Repeated interactions (merit
raises awarded in the past motivate non-verifiable performance in anticipation of raises in the
future) as well as reputation (the dean’s reputation for good judgment and even-handedness)
motivate non-verifiable performance by faculty. But both reputation and repeated interactions are
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insufficient by themselves to make the promises to perform and to reward performance fully
credible. Faculty can move to other institutions thus creating an end game problem that
undermines the discipline of repeated interactions. Moreover, reputation is relatively weak because
of strong norms against sharing bonus information among faculty. Thus, it is plausible that the
additional incentive effects of reciprocity complement the self-enforcing patterns of cooperation
based on reputation and repeat play. In combination, these effects motivate a contractual design
that dominates the alternatives of a trust contract (lockstep raises) or an enforceable incentive
contract that ties compensation to verifiable tasks such as the number of students taught or number
of papers published (creating a multi-tasking problem).130
3. Comfort Agreements (or Agreements to Agree) as a Screen for Self-Enforcement.
The assumption of heterogeneity--some folks behave fairly and some exhibit self-interest-implies that intentionally indefinite agreements (that rely exclusively on reciprocal fairness) are not
first-best efficient. That conclusion is supported by both the experimental evidence and the
evidence of transactional breakdown from the sample of litigated cases. The evidence of
inefficiencies in self-enforcing bonus contracts may offer a plausible explanation for the common
use of legally unenforceable “comfort agreements.” To understand why, recall from the sample
data set that these “comfort agreements” are deliberately indefinite agreements that look to the
formation of a future relationship. Some are in the form of formal letters of intent but most are
more informal agreements.131 They include agreements to lease space in a shopping mall,132 to
execute an executive compensation agreement,133 to sell an insurance agency,134 to enter into a
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partnership,135 to license the construction of a golf course,136 and to invest in a proposed gambling
casino.137 In each case, the courts held that the indefinite terms in the comfort agreement constitute
it an unenforceable “agreement to agree.”138
The question we have posed earlier recurs: Why do parties write these intentionally
unenforceable agreements? It is well known that more formal letters of intent are part of a
continuous negotiation process.139 The parties intention is to go to the next step and convert the
agreement into an enforceable contract. Typically, the enforceable contract is complex and final
negotiation turns on several variables unknown to the parties at the time the letter of intent is
executed. In these cases, therefore, the parties may be learning about each others’s competence140
or waiting to see if a market may shift makes this no longer an attractive venture.141 But the
comfort agreements in the sample cases do not fit the conventional model. Here the informal
agreement and the future transaction are separated in time and are not part of an ongoing
negotiation process. Moreover, the comfort agreement, like the indefinite bonus contract, is simple
in form and offers clearly-defined opportunities to reciprocate.142 One hypothesis is that these
agreements, rather than being designed for parties to learn about each other’s competence or about
market conditions, are designed to allow parties to learn about each other’s taste for reciprocal
fairness. To be sure, self-enforcing bonus agreements are more efficient on average than legally
enforceable agreements that condition only on verifiable measures of performance. But the
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assumption of heterogeneity means that individual promisees risk responding with enhanced
efforts to a selfish promisor who subsequently fails to pay any bonus. This inefficiency could be
reduced if the parties were able effectively to screen for reciprocally fair contracting partners.
The willingness to make an indefinite promise that conditions on non-verifiable factors is
not, by itself, a reliable signal that the promisor is a reciprocally fair type. As we have seen, selfish
promisors will copy the signal since the invitation to reciprocate will induce greater efforts from
the promisee and thus greater returns to the promisor. But the typical comfort agreement has an
additional feature. The agreement itself creates opportunities to reciprocate in advance of the
formalization of the relationship between the parties. Recall, for example, the facts of Hunt v.
Coker,143 where the parties entered into a comfort agreement expressing their joint desire for Coker
to sell and Hunt to buy Coker’s insurance agency.144 The events that followed are instructive.
Upon execution of the agreement, Hunt relocated his agency to Coker’s building. Both Coker and
Hunt worked their own accounts, essentially operating separate businesses but sometimes
brokering policies together. Over time, Coker became unhappy with the quality of Hunt’s work
and informed him the offer to sell would not be honored.
Why should selfish performance by Hunt during this interim period matter to Coker?
Recall that the purchase price agreed upon by the parties was one of several alternatives each of
which was based on the percentage of commissions that renewed over five, six or seven years.
Thus, the sale price of the agency was directly linked to Hunt’s non-verifiable efforts. Viewed in
this light, the transition period created by the comfort agreement takes on new meaning. Coker’s
numerous opportunities to observe Hunt’s behavior may have served as a means of screening for a
reciprocally fair business partner. Hunt’s subsequent shirking then would have signaled that he
was a “selfish” type and that the ultimate sale agreement would not be self-enforcing.
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There are several ways that comfort agreements such as the one in Hunt can function as a
screening device. First, the agreement provides opportunities to observe the behavior of the
promisor in response to opportunities to reciprocate. This gives the promisee the opportunity to
acquire personal knowledge of the character of the promisor.145 To be sure, some promisors may
attempt to “act fair” during the interim period and return to selfish behavior when the future
relationship is cemented. But, in addition to observation, the comfort agreement serves to separate
in time the opportunity to reciprocate from the subsequent transaction that is ultimately
contemplated. It is thus an example of the expenditure of time for the purposes of
communication.146 In this case, potential transactors are not only subject to observation but they
must spend considerable time in the process of executing an agreement that is only selfenforcing.147 Since reciprocally fair individuals are able to capture the returns to general
information about their type through an enhanced reputation for cooperation, they are more willing
to spend resources to provide this information.148 Much like queuing behavior, the expenditure of
time is itself a signal; in this case it may signal a preference for reciprocity.
In sum, while the available evidence is only sufficient for intelligent speculation, the
sample of litigated cases suggests that the widespread use of informal comfort agreements may be
a function of their properties as screens for voluntarily cooperative behavior. Parties entering
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relationships in which measures of performance are non-verifiable will benefit from personal
knowledge of the fairness preferences of their contracting partners. Such knowledge will permit
them to enter transactions in which key measures of performance are non-verifiable without
serious risk.
B. Should Courts Refuse to Enforce Intentionally Incomplete Agreements?
In the preceding discussion I have argued that the theory of reciprocal fairness significantly
expands the domain and the potency of self-enforcing contracts. But the evidence also shows that
self-enforcement does not achieve first-best efficiency. Given a heterogeneous population of
selfish and fair individuals, the self-sanctions for deterring breach of promise are imperfect. Thus,
a logical question is why shouldn’t the legal system combine reciprocity and legal enforcement.
Would it not be more efficient (and more fair) for courts to fill gaps in intentionally incomplete
agreements where the evidence ex post is that the transaction broke down (presumably because
one of the parties was selfish)?
To make the question concrete, return to the contracting example of the New York buyer
and the Indian seller described above in Part II(D). Assume that the New York buyer elects the
self-enforcing indefinite contract, and that the seller delivers goods that are unsatisfactory to the
buyer. The buyer, in turn, declines to pay a bonus. Subsequently, the buyer sues for breach of
contract, seeking rescission and damages, and the seller counterclaims for a “reasonable” bonus.
Should the law seek to complete this contract for the parties?
The answer to this question requires a court to select between the two distinct approaches
to the problem of indefinite agreements. One approach is to follow the modern presumption and
enforce the agreement notwithstanding the indefinite terms. For example, a court could order a
“fair” result by imposing an equitable adjustment – a reasonable bonus in return for a reasonable
effort-- taking all of the contextual factors into account as they appear at the time of
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adjudication.149 This outcome follows from the premise that these intentionally indefinite contracts
create reciprocal duties and courts should enforce those duties when the parties cannot agree.150
Alternatively, the court could follow the precedent of the cases invoking the doctrine of
indefiniteness and dismiss the buyer’s claim for damages as well as the seller’s claim for a
reasonable bonus. Under this common law approach, the evidence that the incompleteness was
intentional would generate an inference that the parties did not intend to be legally bound. The
cause would be dismissed, and the losses would lie where they fall.
Which approach is best? At first blush, the robust evidence of reciprocal behavior seems to
require that the law acknowledge explicitly the value of reciprocal fairness. One might argue, for
example, that courts should create default standards of reasonableness to bolster the implicit
patterns of reciprocity that have broken down in this particular instance.151 Or, alternatively, one
might suggest that, where a contract creates an opportunity for beneficial reciprocity, a court
should enforce such a duty by imposing an equitable adjustment when one of the parties has
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apparently behaved selfishly.152
For several reasons, however, the theory of reciprocal fairness supports adherence to the
common law indefiniteness doctrine. First, the prospect of legal enforcement can create a moral
hazard risk that may deter parties from writing self-enforcing agreements. To see why, return to
the example in Part II(D) of the Indian seller and the New York buyer. Assume the parties have
chosen the indefinite bonus contract. Now assume that courts abandon the common law rule on
indefiniteness and adopt the modern presumption of enforcement. This implies that a court will,
with positive probability, entertain a breach of contract claim and try to decide what is fair. The
prospect that the agreement might be legally enforceable creates an enhanced risk of cheating by
the seller. A seller who produces low quality goods may now threaten to sue for breach of
contract, claiming that she produced high quality goods and was entitled to a bonus. Since high
quality is not verifiable, the buyer faces an enhanced risk of hold-up. The problem is that the legal
enforcement rule itself creates a motive for a seller to sue, apart from any assumption that fair
sellers will sue because they are angry. Given what a court will do, litigation can maximize any
seller’s expected profits and thus the hold-up threat is credible.
Moreover, if a court will potentially enforce a bonus promise against the buyer where the
seller has, in fact, delivered low quality goods, it no longer is rational for buyers to offer the
intentionally incomplete bonus agreement.153 Thus, the prospect of legal enforcement–and its
associated moral hazard risk-- may motivate the buyer to abandon the bonus agreement altogether.
This would be an inferior outcome because, as we have seen, the self-enforcing bonus agreement
is socially efficient: high quality generates a greater surplus than low quality and there is a positive
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probability that the contract will generate high quality. Now consider the alternative: The court
denies relief on the grounds that it cannot verify whether the seller delivered high quality goods
and thus cannot grant a remedy. The non-enforcement approach restores the buyer’s incentive to
offer the self-enforcing bonus contract.
The preceding argument shows that an attempt legally to enforce the non-verifiable terms
in deliberately incomplete contracts is socially inefficient. A further question is whether the same
conclusion holds if courts attempt to enforce the verifiable terms in agreements that otherwise
depend on self-enforcement. Recall that in the example of the Indian seller and the New York
buyer the parties initially faced a choice between an obligationally complete contract
(merchantable quality goods for a $50,000 price) and an indefinite bonus contract (a $40,000 base
price with a bonus of up to $20,000 in return for delivery of high quality goods). Now suppose
that the parties reach an agreement that combines the features of both options. The buyer offers a
price of $50,000 with a bonus of as much as $10,000 if the seller delivers high quality goods
satisfactory to the buyer. In addition, the contract specifies that buyer can recover $10,000
liquidated damages if the seller does not provide at least merchantable quality goods.
Merchantable quality, recall, is verifiable to a court. In this example, then, the parties have agreed
to a verifiable obligation that, if severable from the indefinite bonus, would be legally enforceable.
Assume the seller delivers non-merchantable goods that do not “pass without objection in the
trade” and the buyer seeks recovery of the stipulated damages. The seller claims, in turn, that the
entire agreement is indefinite and unenforceable.
It is tempting to suggest that granting a remedy to the buyer in this instance is socially
optimal. After all, this portion of the agreement was definite and certain. The breach by the seller
does not implicate the indefinite promise of a bonus for high quality performance. But the critical
question is whether legal enforcement of the verifiable terms would adversely affect the potency
of reciprocity as a means of enforcing the non-verifiable terms of the agreement. In other words,
the question is how do explicit, legal incentives to abide by the terms of a contract interact with
motivations of fairness and reciprocity?
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A recent series of experiments by Fehr and Gachter using a variation of the Gift Exchange
Game examine this question.154 In the control version of these experiments, buyers offer a trust
contract at a stipulated price and a desired level of effort. If the seller accepts this offer, she is free
to choose her actual level of effort. The higher the level of effort chosen, the more costly to the
seller. In each experimental session, there are eight sellers and six buyers, each of whom can
contract with only a single seller.155 All participants know that there is an excess supply of sellers.
Thus, in principle, the buyers can enforce very low prices and selfish sellers have no incentive to
provide any effort above the minimum level. The results, by now predictable, are that many
buyers in fact offer quite generous prices, and many sellers respond with greater efforts,
substantially above the selfish choice.156 In the second version of the experiment, the buyers are
allowed to impose a sanction (e.g., a monetary fine) if the seller shirks on her effort obligation.157
Thus, this version in essence adds the dimension of legal enforcement to the incomplete trust
contract just described (one might, for example, think of the fine as damages for breach of
contract). The results show that the average price offered by buyers and the average effort of
sellers is lower in the presence of explicit, legally enforceable sanctions. Without legal
enforcement, reciprocal fairness generates high levels of performance. But once the interaction is
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backed by legal sanctions, reciprocity declines and overall performance is reduced.158 This result
suggests that implicit incentives based on reciprocity and explicit, legally enforceable performance
duties may indeed be in conflict with each other.159 In particular, explicit incentives may “crowd
out” behavior based on reciprocal fairness.160
The “crowding out” phenomenon observed in the experiments may seem counterintuitive,
particularly since other experiments have shown that a combination of self-enforcing incentives
actually increases contracting efficiency.161 Why might reciprocal fairness and repeated
interactions be complements while reciprocal fairness and legal enforcement are substitutes? One
conjecture is based on the fact that legal enforcement is structured as a zero sum game in which
the promisee threatens ex ante to sanction the promisor for subsequent nonperformance. The
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explicit, ex ante nature of legal sanctions may thus undermine the instinct to reciprocate. Fair
types may simply regard legal enforcement as unfair since they are willing to reciprocate
voluntarily, while selfish types may interpret the threat of sanction through legal enforcement as a
signal that the promisee is unlikely to be a reciprocator.162 The same explicit threat does not exist
in the case of repeated interactions where the implicit sanction (terminating the relationship) is
imposed ex post after the shirking has been observed. In that sense, ex post punishment may be
perceived as “fairer” than the ex ante announcement of damages for breach.
The evidence that voluntary cooperation may be undermined by explicit legal obligations is
a further argument in favor of the formalist approach to contract law that has been historically
followed by the common law. The instinct to preserve a space for reciprocal fairness may explain
the common law preference for simple, binary, winner-take-all legal rules.163 Within the
framework of a few clear rules, parties can respond to implicit opportunities to behave
reciprocally, even in one shot interactions. Obviously, these effects are magnified in relational
settings in which parties can “lock in” to a long-term cooperative equilibrium.164
Notwithstanding the power of reciprocal fairness, contractual breakdowns nonetheless
occur, in part because, as the experimental evidence suggests, there is both self interest and
reciprocity in the world. But given such a world, the puzzle of indefinite contracts may now be
solved. Contracting parties may simply may have learned to behave under two sets of rules: an
explicit (and rigid) set of rules for legal enforcement and an implicit (flexible) set of rules for selfenforcement. It may be, therefore, that the great lesson for courts is that any effort to judicialize
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preferences for fairness will destroy the very informality that makes reciprocity so effective in the
first instance. The experimental evidence suggests that the contemporary judicial instinct to fill
gaps in incomplete contracts with broadly applicable standards of reasonableness and fair
treatment may actually undermine the very norms of fairness that the legal system seeks to
advance. If so, it is critical that courts do not generalize about the potency of reciprocal fairness
from the litigated cases, as these disputes only arise when the implicit incentives themselves have
broken down. The cases give no clue of the power of reciprocal fairness in situations where these
social preferences may have been effective in enforcing incomplete contracts between perfect
strangers. Understood in the broader context of a system that relies on both legal and selfenforcement, the wisdom of the common law approach becomes clearer.165
CONCLUSION
The doctrine that declares unenforceable an agreement that is uncertain or indefinite in its
material terms is a core principle of the common law of contracts. Conventional academic wisdom
holds that the doctrine is an artifact of a discredited legal formalism. It is assumed that
contemporary American courts work to enforce incomplete contracts by filling gaps with broad
standards of reasonableness and good faith. But in an important class of cases the conventional
wisdom is misleading. A systematic review of the case law shows that courts continue to adhere to
the indefiniteness doctrine, declining to enforce contracts where the parties have intentionally
declined to condition performance on verifiable measures that could have been specified at
relatively low cost.
This evidence is puzzling in two distinct respects. First, these intentionally incomplete
agreements are inconsistent with the assumptions of contract theory that contracting parties will
discard non-verifiable measures of performance but will contract over low-cost, verifiable
measures. Second, the judicial decisions not to enforce these agreements are inconsistent with the
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assumption of most contemporary theorists that courts can (and do) enhance the fairness and the
efficiency of contractual exchange by filling contractual gaps whenever possible.
The alternative of self-enforcement is the most plausible explanation for why parties
intentionally write incomplete agreements even in isolated transactions between relative strangers.
Where self-enforcement is effective, it is more efficient than legal enforcement. The traditional
understanding is that self-enforcement is limited to contexts where reputation or repeated
interactions are sufficient to make promises credible. Recent work in experimental economics
suggests, however, that reciprocal fairness is a potent additional means of self-enforcement.
Whether reciprocal fairness is a learned behavior that derives from the benefits of cooperation in
repeated interactions or is an intrinsic motivation remains an open question. But the important
point is that the evidence suggests that the domain of self-enforcing contracts extends to isolated
interactions between strangers. Intentionally incomplete contracts of the sort routinely dismissed
by courts have a common feature: the agreements are simple in form, clear in commitment and are
structured to create opportunities for parties to reciprocate in ways that expand the contractual
surplus.166
One of the robust findings of the fairness experiments is that we live in an heterogenous
world in which a significant fraction of individuals behave as if they are reciprocally fair and an
equal fraction respond only to self-interest. This phenomenon of heterogeneity provides an
explanation for another category of intentionally incomplete agreements. Parties commonly write
informal “agreements to agree” (what I have termed “comfort agreements”). Among other
purposes, these agreements can function as means of screening for reciprocally fair business
partners; providing an opportunity for each party to observe the other’s character over time.
Legal analysts have a further concern: should courts intervene to enforce these indefinite
agreements when reciprocity fails? The answer to the legal policy question depends on whether
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legal enforcement is a complement to or a substitute for self-enforcement through reciprocity.
The available evidence suggests that legally enforcing troublesome agreements may be
counterproductive. If courts use principles of fairness to legally enforce non-verifiable promises,
the parties will abandon these self-enforcing agreements. Even where courts only enforce
verifiable promises, there is some evidence that judicial intervention crowds out the instinct to
reciprocate. Legal enforcement, then, will have negative effects in reducing the potency of
reciprocal fairness in the great majority of cases where self-enforcement is currently effective.
The evidence that legal sanctions and voluntary cooperation are incompatible both
explains and justifies the determination of contemporary courts to strictly police the boundary
between the two domains. Perhaps the puzzle of deliberately incomplete contracts is only a
conundrum for academic lawyers, whose occupational hazard is to assume that without law there is
no social order. To the contrary, there are strong reasons to believe that fairness matters, and
because of those reasons the law should leave space for reciprocity to work.
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Rose, 127 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Conn. 2001)

DC

Howell, USA, 51 Fed. Cl. 516 (Fed. Cl. 2002)
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Relational
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STATE

CASE CITATION

TYPE OF

PARTIES

TRANSACTION

167

Transactions are characterized as either relational or discrete indicating the extent to which the parties are
(or were) in ongoing relationships rather than isolated or one-shot exchange transactions.
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687 (2002)

MD

Lacy v. Arvin, 780 A.2d 1180 (Md.App. 2001)
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Cases are coded by states, type of transaction and nature of parties as in Table 1, supra. In addition, the
cases are coded by “Type of Contract”: inadvertent incompleteness, deliberately incomplete agreement, indefinite
bonus-type agreement, general agreement to agree, comfort agreement, and formal letter of intent.
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